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There are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) measures, a gap the dissertation has partly filled by exploring the Terrorism 
Amnesty and Reintegration Program (ARP) in Kenya using both qualitative and quantitative 
data. ARP developments have occurred in a political context wherein foreign government have 
been eager to advance CVE and the Kenyan Government has more-or-less gone along with that. 
The implication here is whether such policies will be effective and sustainable in Kenya. 
Importantly, if we view Kenya in a regional and even global context, it is now something of a 
"critical case" for CVE, given the extent of donor interest (and government effort) in advancing 
CVE. In this regard, there are no doubt lessons that can and should be learned from Kenya for 
those supportive of CVE in other part of Africa and the developing world. The first objective 
involved a process evaluation to understand agency related factors that led to the creation of 
ARP, determine if there was program integrity in its implementation, and its theoretical 
similarities with focused deterrence technique (FD). Process evaluation involved a content 
analysis of 150 newspapers and government-related documents. Results show that there are key 
theoretical similarities between ARP and focused deterrence technique (FD) particularly the 
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social aspect of FD and the paradigm shift from hard militarized to “soft” power counter-
terrorism strategies. There was program integrity on the ground but poor coordination between 
security agencies and community emanating from mistrust casts doubt on the success and 
sustainability of the program. The second objective involved an in-depth survey of Kenyan 
Police Commanders (n=273) randomly stratified by designation (Formations or specialized 
units and General Duty) to understand police perceptions of the intended effect and 
appropriateness of offering amnesty to radicalized youth. Results show that officers associate 
ARP with risk as majority widely think that Kenya could face more challenges because of the 
burgeoning number of returnees in the program as participants can seize this opportunity to 
infiltrate their ideologies into the program. Most officers not only agreed that it was difficult to 
identify genuine returnees but that the program is lenient on terrorists. Arguably, if police as 
implementers don’t like CVE as shown by their perceptions, then ARP will not work owing to 
police culture of resistance to change and police discretion. The policy implication of the police 
survey findings suggests that implementers of ARP should train all Gazetted Officers on CVE 
benefits because success of CVE largely depends on perceptions and commitment of police 
commanders. This dissertation has contributed to CVE literature in Africa where studies 
utilizing primary data on CVE are lacking. The point of departure with previous CVE research 
is the use of primary data from Kenyan Police.  
Key words: terrorism amnesty, process evaluation, content analysis, reintegrating terrorists, al 
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Kenya has witnessed unprecedented upsurge in frequency and magnitude of attacks from 
the Somali-based Al-Shabaab terrorists. The situation escalated after Kenyan military troops 
invaded Somalia in 2011 (NCTC, 2016; KNCHR, 2014). In April 2015, al Shabaab staged the 
deadliest attack in Kenya in the post August 7, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi. The 
Garissa University College attack claimed 148 lives. As a result, President Uhuru Kenyatta 
promised to respond “in the fiercest way possible” (reports, n.d.), but Al Shabaab defiantly 
warned Kenya of “gruesome war” unless she withdraws her troops from Somalia (“Al Shabaab 
Promises ‘Gruesome War’ in Kenya After Massacre at University | VICE News,” n.d.; AFP, 
n.d.; Lough and Sheikh, 2013). This situation has pushed the country to the frontline of a 
regional and global struggle against terrorist groups and violent extremists (NCTC, 2016). In 
2015 ahead of a state visit by U.S. President Barrack Obama to Kenya, CNN described Kenya as 
a “hotbed of terror” but soon apologized due to public demand (Mutiga, 2015).  
As the nation grapples with serious threats of terrorism and violent extremism (VE), the 
Government of Kenya (GK) surprisingly responded by promoting Countering Violent Extremism 
(CVE) through a terrorist Amnesty and Reintegration Program (ARP) (Republic of Kenya-
UNDP Kenya, 2015, p.23). ARP is a novel strategy offered to radicalized youth on condition that 
they voluntarily surrender to the national security agencies. It targets ex-al-Shabaab terrorists 
(commonly referred to as returnees or foreign terrorist fighters) for purposes of reintegration 
back into community. These include youths that are at risk of engaging in terrorist-related 
activities owing to their association with al-Shabaab, youths who have fled from Al-Shabaab and 




for their surrender, youths are provided with training and social services including psychological 
counseling, to assist in desistance from terrorism. From the onset, the amnesty was received with 
mixed public reactions; a section of the clergy however rejected a “blanket amnesty for 
terrorists” (Kibet, 2015), while some leaders from Muslim communities expressed their 
skepticism in the program due to lack of an amnesty law.  
The late Cabinet Secretary (CS) for Interior and Coordination of National Government, 
Major General (Rtd.) Joseph Nkaissery announced the 10-days amnesty on April 14, 2015 
(Ombati, n.d.; “Amnesty | Define Amnesty at Dictionary.com,” n.d.; “Church opposes amnesty 
for Al Shabaab followers :: Kenya - The Standard,” n.d.; “Nkaissery extends amnesty for 
Shabaab youths by 2 weeks » Capital News,” 2015; “Kenya extends amnesty period for al-
Shabaab recruits,” n.d.). Nkaissery directly and repeatedly warned that failure to surrender will 
attract the full force of law, because they will be deemed ‘aware and condone, or are party to the 
terrorist attendant with criminal consequences’ (Ombati, 2015).  
What is puzzling about ARP is the radical paradigm shift from the country’s heavy-
handed, militaristic anti-terrorism strategies to the “soft” power CVE approach. No doubt, CVE 
has expanded rapidly in the last decade and many countries have embraced despite the 
uncertainty about its effectiveness. Romaniuk (2015) has argued that CVE is a “field that has 
risen to prominence in a manner disproportional to its achievements”.  
Notably, Kenya joined efforts with other nations through global CVE meetings seeking 
solutions to VE defined here as “radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or 
actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political 
systems or ideologies” (NCTC, 2016, p. V). During the February 2015 White House Summit on 




gathering, military force, and law enforcement alone will not solve-and when misused can in fact 
exacerbate-the problem of violent extremism” (“The White House Summit to Counter Violent 
Extremism Ministerial Meeting Statement,” n.d., p. 1). They emphasized that CVE requires a 
multi-agency approach including provision of economic opportunities, expanding role of youth, 
promote community policing, and counter extremist narratives, and collaboration between state 
and non-state actors especially civil society and religious leaders. The U.S. Department of State 
in its 2017 “Annual Report of Assistance Related to International Terrorism Fiscal Year 2014” 
states that 
CVE programs aim to deny terrorism new recruits by reducing sympathy and support 
within communities for VE by: (1) building resilience among those at-risk of recruitment 
and radicalization to violence; (2) countering violent extremist narratives and messaging; 
and (3) developing partner-nation and civil-society capacity and political will to CVE.  
Clearly, APR was modelled alongside the recommendations from such CVE conferences. 
In this regard, the present study views ARP as a reintegration program. GK defines reintegration 
as “actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of 
rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities, and that 
ensure that they remain peaceful and law-abiding in the long run” (NCTC, 2016). As a 
reintegration program, ARP reflects a policy intervention that is based on focused deterrence 
technique (FD). The author argued that ARP shares key theoretical similarities with FD 
particularly, the social aspect of FD and paradigm shift from hard to “soft” approach. In FD 
implementers focus on high-risk offenders by directly engaging in dialogue with the participants 
to disrupt/deter violence, and engage in direct communication with potential offenders vial a 




Counter-Terrorism Centre, a multi-agency of national security agencies, provides returnees with 
social and psychological counselling services.  
While there are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of CVE measures, 
the dearth of literature on ARP limits our understanding of the program. There were hardly two 
studies about ARP. Widely cited was a joint report by International Organization of Migration 
(IOM), [Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims] SUPKEM, and Ministry of Interior. The study 
based on an interview with 148 returnees found that at least 700 returnees were in Kenya (“500 
Al-Shabab”, 2016; “Al-Shabab recruits return”, 2015; “700 Al-Shabab recruits, 2015). Besides, 
BRICS East Africa pilot programme examined the success and effectiveness of the amnesty offer 
and the cooperation between the County and National Government in CVE activities. The study 
found that 48 returnees were undergoing reintegration in Coast Region. They further observed 
that the program was marred with poor coordination between security agencies and the 
community, and lacked transparency and information (“BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - 
March 2016.pdf,” n.d.) .  
Justification of Study 
It is not clear whether young democracies like Kenya are under donor pressure to 
embrace CVE policies considering the significant donor funding of CVE in Africa. Notably, 
ARP developments have occurred in a political context wherein foreign government have been 
eager to advance CVE and the Kenyan Government has more-or-less gone along with that. The 
implication here is whether such policies will be effective and sustainable in Kenya. Importantly, 
if we view Kenya in a regional and even global context, it is now something of a "critical case" 




regard, there are no doubt lessons that can and should be learned from Kenya for those 
supportive of CVE in other part of Africa and the developing world. 
Kenya thus makes a good case selection for three reasons. Primarily, Kenya has witnessed 
an unprecedented upsurge of terrorist attacks since 2011 after KDF invaded Somalia to fight the 
militia (Government of Kenya-UNDP, 2015; KNCHR, 2014). The situation has been escalating 
by the ongoing countrywide radicalization and recruitment of youths into al-Shabaab, which no 
longer targets Kenyan Somalis but youths from all backgrounds (Jones, 2013). As such, the need 
for evidence-based research to inform government policy and practice on counter-terrorism and 
CVE in Kenya cannot be gainsaid.  
Previous research evaluating effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies suggests that we 
do not know whether they work or do not work (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). Moreover, 
there is plenty of research on CVE but they predominantly feature developed countries, yet “CVE 
is context specific” (Farsight, 2016; Romaniuk, 2015; Holmer, 2013; Denoeux and Carter, 2009). 
As such, “studies have yet to identify a single tactic which can work in all countries and cultures” 
(Adrich, 2014) or which CT policy is effective (Pillar, 2001).  
Central to the dissertation is the relatively biased focus of terrorism research on terrorists 
compared to law enforcement, despite the critical role of police in the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and their expertise in their job. A Campbell Collaboration systematic review found much 
fewer peer-reviewed and empirical studies based on law enforcement response to terrorism 
compared to causes of terrorism or impacts of terrorism (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006). As 
Jenkins (2015) asserted, inclusion of police practitioners-as-authors in research may increase the 
quality of police scholarship because “police are the experts in their areas” (p. 508; also see Sytsma 




in CVE, it is important to examine role of individual “connectors” whether they are police officers, 
youth workers or community members (Spalek, 2014, p. 837). Stewart & Morris emphasized that 
“sound policy that will affect local law enforcement cannot exist without the indispensable insight 
of police administrators” (p. 292). This dissertation has partly filled this gap by examining 
perception of Kenyan Police Officers about CVE because understanding police perceptions about 
ARP is important for determining the utility of government youth intervention programs for 
terrorism and policy improvement in CT/CVE. 
From a theoretical perspective, previous studies have examined application of FD to 
controlling gun and gang offenders and concluded that it is a “promising” strategy (Kennedy, 
2011). Essentially, “promising strategies to refer to “programs for which the levels of certainty 
from available evidence is too low to support generalizable conclusions, but for which there is 
some empirical basis for predicting that further research could support such conclusions 
(Sherman et al., 1998, p. 7).  
Very little is known however about feasibility of pulling levers when applied to different 
contexts and diverse groups of offenders (Corsaro et al., 2012) or different crime problems 
(Kennedy, 2006), a gap that the dissertation has partly filled by examining theoretical similarities 
between FD and ARP through a process evaluation.  
Within this context, the purpose of this study was twofold; the first objective was to offer 
a process evaluation of ARP to see if there is program integrity in its implementation process, 
and theoretical similarities with FD framework. The second objective was to do an-in-depth 
survey assessing perception of senior police officers (Gazetted Officers) (GOs) to understand 
their thoughts as implementers, about the appropriateness of amnesty-driven CVE as a counter-





 The author asked, what does the Amnesty and Reintegration Program in Kenya entail? 
The objective of this qualitative question was to understand the motivations for instituting ARP, 
level of “program integrity” on the ground, and see if it shares patterns with FD framework. The 
dependent variable was implementation. Program integrity was reported if ARP was delivered as 
intended in theory (FD framework) and design of Kenya’s national CVE plan - National Strategy 
to Counter Violent Extremism (NCTC, 2016). In so doing, a process evaluation was conducted 
using content analysis. Content analysis is the “systematic reading of a body of texts, images, 
and symbolic matter, not necessary from an author’s or user’s perspective” (Krippendorff, 1989, 
p.403).  
 Butts explains that process evaluation is used to “assesses the conceptualization, design, 
delivery, and measurement of client interventions before those interventions are subjected to a 
more rigorous outcome evaluation” (Butts, 2011, p. 10). It helps in establishing “whether the 
program is implemented in a way which ensures that the mechanism is able to operate” (Butts, 
2011, p. 6; also see Chapman & Hough, 1998). Process evaluation framework was the lens used 
to assess the ongoing process of Kenya's move from hard to “soft” power using the amnesty 
policy as a case study. In other words, if FD is the mechanism that makes it work, how does the 
on-the-ground implementation of ARP measure up to the CVE model for Kenya, and what 
barriers stand in the way of its broader acceptance by the police doing the work? This led to the 
second research question.  
 The second question was quantitative in nature and asked, what is the perception of 
police officers regarding countering violent extremism as a counter-terrorism strategy? The 




was operationalized as pessimism, optimism, risk, preparedness, and autonomy/discretion. This 
approach was previously used by Stewart and Morris (2009) and Lurigio and Skogan (1994). 
Assessing police perception was important because as Lurigio and Skogan (1994) argued, “the 
success of community policing depends on the [Chicago] police officers who are responsible for 
implementing the programs” (p. 315). As such, “their attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors must 
be substantially changed before [community policing] can be put into practice” (p. 315).  
 Likewise, if police as implementers do not like CVE/ARP, then it will not work largely 
due to their culture of resistance to change (Skogan, 2008; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994). The success 
and sustainability of ARP will largely depend on police perceptions of the program. Police work 
is dangerous, and officers exercise enormous discretion in their decision-making. As a 
paramilitary organization, they remain isolated from the public and maintain an “us vs. them” 
mentality due to mistrust in the members of public. These factors associated are nuanced, making 
it necessary for policy makers and practitioners within NCTC to understand perception of police 
commanders, if they want to realize the success of ARP because this is a police-community 
based intervention.  
To the best of my knowledge, this was the first attempt to independently assess 
implementation process and police perceptions about ARP. This was a departure from the 
previous CVE studies predominantly focused on ex-terrorists and donor-driven. The dissertation 
has contributed to literature in Africa where studies utilizing primary data on CVE, especially 
from police are lacking. This is particularly so considering that amnesty-driven approaches as 
terrorism-prevention strategy are yet to be implemented on a widespread basis. It provides a 
great deal of guidance to both practitioners and researchers interested in such strategies. In 




between the program and FD particularly the social aspect of FD and the paradigm shift from 
hard militarized to “soft” power counter-terrorism strategies. The quantitative aspect of this 
study has demonstrated that specialized police units were supportive of CVE than General Duty 
were. This implies that policy makers and practitioners should train all police commanders 
irrespective of their designations about the potential benefits of CVE otherwise police 
perceptions will most likely hinder success and sustainability of CVE owing to police culture.  
The dissertation includes six chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction laying down the 
objectives of the study, its justification, research questions and study implication. Chapter 2 is 
the literature review on the background of the National Police Service, counter-terrorism 
strategies in Kenya, ARP as a case study, previous research on CVE, and lessons from Amnesty-
Driven CVEs to inform the present study and identify the gap in literature. Chapter 3 is the 
conceptual framework including explanations of radicalization and disengagement processes, 
police perception studies, and focused deterrence technique. Methodology is in chapter four. 
Results are in chapter 5, and includes ethical considerations, data quality issues, limitations, 
contribution to policy and practice, and future research. Finally, Chapter 6 entails discussion and 













Selection of literature was based on relevance to inform the dissertation and identify gap 
in the literature. American Psychological Association (APA) states that “when summarizing 
earlier works, avoid nonessential details; instead, literature review should emphasize pertinent 
findings, relevant methodological issues, and major conclusions” (American Psychological 
Association, 2010, p. 28). Unfortunately, there is scarcity in literature about ARP. There were no 
publicly available primary data about ARP, other than media reports. The reviewed literature 
thus included online media content, secondary data sources including books, scholarly peer 
reviewed articles, and organizational reports and websites. The review covers four key areas 
namely; counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya; Amnesty and Reintegration Program as a case 
study; previous research on CVE; and lessons from Amnesty-Driven CVEs.  
To begin with, the National Police Service (NPS) is established under Article 243 of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 which saw the merger of Kenya Police Service (KPS or Kenya 
Police) and Administration Police Service (APS or AP). NPS falls under the Ministry of Interior 
and Coordination of National Government (hereafter Ministry of Interior). NPS is a centralized 
organization. It is commanded by an Inspector General of Police (IG), who is supported by two 
Deputy IGs (D-IG) in charge of each of the two services. There is also Director of Directorate of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI) who reports directly to the IG per the NPS Act No. 30 of 2011 
(“No. 30 of 2012,” n.d.). The current study is focused on KPS defined here as Kenya Police and 
DCI per the Force Standing Orders (Government of Kenya, 2001 [1962]). The history of Kenya 
Police dates to the period between 1887–1902 when police served the Imperial British East 




business along the Kenyan Coast. Until 1907, the Kenya Police was organized along military 
lines having been modeled after Sir Robert Peel’s London “Bobbies”.  
 
Source: Dowd, C. (2015, August 7). Al Shabaab in Kenya: Emerging Dynamics and Shifts. Retrieved 
January 25, 2018, from https://www.acleddata.com/2015/08/07/al-shabaab-in-kenya-august-2015-update/ 
 
Since its inception, KPS has expanded tremendously to a bureaucratic organization with 
roles broadly designated into either specialized units or General Duty/Regular Police (for details, 




Unit as its official paramilitary unit. After 9/11, Kenya joined the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and established the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 2002. ATPU was meant to 
increase the capabilities of Kenya to identify, arrest, detain, and prosecute terrorist suspects 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). In 2016, there were approximately 90,000 NPS officers charged with 
the security of the near 45 million Kenyans. Out of this, 40,000 are in Kenya Police as per the 
NPS Annual Report FY 2014-15 (see “Downloads - Downloads,” n.d.). There were 
approximately 1,200 Gazetted Officers (GOs) 1in KPS in December 2016. Gazetted Officers are 
senior officers at the management level. In the Force Standing Orders (FSO), they included the 
ranks of Acting Superintendent (now Assistant Superintendent) and above (see Government of 
Kenya, 2018; Government of Kenya, 2001; “No. 11A of 2011,” n.d.). NPS supports the National 
Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in counter-terrorism operations. CT operations have typically 
targeted three regions vulnerable to terrorist attacks namely North Eastern, Coast and Nairobi 
regions as shown in Figure 1. 
Counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya 
In August 7, 1998, the Al Qaeda terrorist group bombed the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi 
killing over 200 Kenyans, 12 Americans, and injuring 5,000 others (Republic of Kenya, 2013; 
Whitaker, 2008; Barkan, 2004). In November 28, 2002, they bombed an Israeli-owned Paradise 
Hotel in Mombasa, and attempted to bring down an El Al plane with shoulder-fired SA-7 
missiles (Barkan, 2004). As one of America’s strongest allies in East Africa on CT, Kenya 
received [and continues to receive] massive financial support (Prestholdt, 2011; Whitaker, 2008) 
including training of some 500 security officers (Barkan, 2014) in CT. Apart from the 1998 
bombing, terror threat in the country remained relatively low. In February 2003, the government 
                                                 




announced that al Qaeda cell was in Mombasa. America too warned of possible terrorist attack in 
the country and together with the UK, issued travel advisories to their citizens not to visit Kenya 
(Krause and Otenyo, 2005; Barkan, 2004). The situation fed into Al-Shabaab’s propaganda that 
“Kenya is now officially a war zone and as such any tourists visiting the country do so at their 
own peril” (“Kenya is a war zone, warns al-Shabaab after Somali Islamists massacre 48 | World 
news | The Guardian,” n.d.). These travel advisories had far-reaching impact on Kenya’s 
economy. Tourism earnings declined to 84.6 billion Kenyan Shillings in 2015 from KSh 87.1 
billion in 2014, while international visitor arrivals declined by 12.6% in 2015 (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2016).  
However, the threat situation increased from 2011. On October 1, 2011, Marie Dedieu, a 
disabled French woman was kidnapped from her home in Manda Island in Coast Region 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). On October 13, 2011, al Shabaab kidnapped two female Spanish 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) aid workers from Dadaab refugee camp and took them to 
Somalia (Republic of Kenya, 2013). For a country where tourism is a major foreign exchange 
earner, it became incumbent upon the government to take immediate action to protect 
sovereignty and avert further victimization (kidnappings) of foreigners. Consequently, in 
October 14, 2011, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) invaded Somalia under Operation Linda Nchi 
(Protect the Nation) to fight al Shabaab (GK and UNDP Kenya, 2015; Republic of Kenya, 2013). 
Their strategy was to create a buffer zone along the Kenya-Somali border to prevent further 
cross-border attacks (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). KDF later joined the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012 and together liberated key areas in Somalia from 
al-Shabaab (Atta-Asamoah, 2015).  




major attacks on Kenya including Mpeketoni in Coast where 48 people were killed in 2014 
(Cilliers, 2015), Westgate Mall siege in Nairobi that claimed 67 lives in 2013 (Williams, 2015), 
Garissa University College attack in 2015 that claimed 148 lives (UNDP Kenya, 2015), and El 
Adde in Somalia where unknown number of Kenyan soldiers died in 2016 (“Somalia’s al-Shabab 
killed ‘180 Kenyan troops’ in el-Ade - BBC News,” n.d.; “Kenya covers up military massacre - 
CNN,” n.d.). Some argue that Linda Nchi “effectively made the country a prime target for Al-
Shabaab and its sympathizers” (Atta-Asamoah, 2015, p. 2). Regardless, former Chief of Defence 
Forces, General Julius Karangi in 2011 emphasized that KDF must ensure ‘highly degraded Al-
shabaab capacity’ before leaving (“State offers amnesty to Kenyans in terror group - Daily 
Nation,” n.d.; (“Army will leave Somalia when border is safe, says Karangi - Daily Nation,” 
n.d.). 
Whether KDF should withdraw from the 22,000 UN backed AMISOM to avert the so-
called “retaliatory attacks” (Metre, 2016; Menkaush, 2014; Bruton and Williams, 2014) is a 
contentious political issue beyond the scope of this study. Here is the paradox nonetheless: 
besides the July 2010 attack that claimed 74 lives of World Cup football fans in Uganda, the 
militia has victimized no other AMISOM member country more than Kenya outside its base in 
Somalia (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Interestingly, Uganda has contributed the largest contingent 
to AMISON (over 6,000 troops) compared to the about 4,000 troops from Kenya (“Uganda - 
UPDFUganda - UPDFUganda - UPDF,” n.d.). Likewise, in May 2016, High Court Judge 
Alphonse Owiny Dollo of Uganda sentenced five convicts of the Kampala bombing ( (“Five 
jailed for life in Uganda for al Shabaab World Cup bombings | Reuters,” n.d.; “Four Kenyans 




victimization, the prevailing discrepancies depict an unclear cause of hostility of al Shabaab 
against Kenya.  
In the meantime, military operations have continued alongside police crackdowns in 
“hotspots” (areas considered vulnerable or at high risk to radicalization and terrorist attacks) 
including Nairobi, Coast (Kilifi, Kwale, Tana, Lamu and Mombasa) and North-Eastern regions 
(Garissa, Mandera, Wajir)  (NCTC, 2016; “strengthening community’s resilience 
againstradicalization and violent extremism,” n.d.; David, n.d.) . The aim is to mop up illegal 
immigrants suspected to be involved in youth indoctrination or planning terrorism (Republic of 
Kenya-UNDP, 2015, p. 7). It is a strategy informed by situational crime prevention theories of 
crime, the argument that crime is not evenly distributed across the geographic landscape. In like 
manner, terrorism studies suggest that terrorism concentrates in certain areas. Per the Global 
Terrorism Index (2014) for instance, 80% of terrorist attacks occurred in five countries including 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. Likewise, from 2007, 12% of al-Shabaab attacks 
were against Kenyan hotspots (Jones, 2013).  
The fact that these “hotspots” happen to be predominantly Muslim neighborhoods has 
always presented a challenge to place-based counter-terrorism approach in Kenya. An example is 
Eastleigh estate in Nairobi which is typically dominated by people of Somali origin. Nicknamed 
“Little Mogadishu” (“Little Mogadishu | Hurst Publishers,” n.d.), law enforcement perceive 
Eastleigh areas (Muslim Youth Centre (MYC)/ Pumwani Muslim Youth) as a hideout for illegal 
immigrants (IPOA, 2014) and recruitment grounds of al-Shabaab members (UN Security 
Council, 2011). While addressing Parliament in 2011, the late Assistant Minister for Internal 




animal with its head in Eastleigh, Nairobi and the tail in Somalia" (“Minister says Eastleigh the 
next target in hunt for Al Shabaab militants :: Kenya - The Standard,” n.d.) .  
Consequently, in May 2015, GK conducted a major crackdown dubbed “Operation Sanitization 
of Eastleigh” or “Usalama Watch” (Safety Watch) in Eastleigh. The operation involving over 
6,000 NPS officers was meant to flush out al-Shabaab adherents/aliens and search for weapons 
and explosive, and deter terrorism (IPOA, 2014). As a result, 4,000 people were arrested during 
the operation, 557 deported, and 730 sent back to refugee camps (Republic of Kenya-UNDP, 
2015, p. 7).  
Ironically, operations were extended to Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps that host 
over 600,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2014). The Asman Kamama-led Parliamentary Committee on 
National Security described Dadaab as a “nursery for terrorists” and “conducive for 
radicalization/ recruitment” (MKAWALE, n.d.; NCTC, 2016; “report of the joint committee" 
n.d.). In 2016, GK began plans to close Daadab, the world’s largest refugee camp after its 25 
years of existence, amidst humanitarian concerns from the UN. Somalia government however 
warned that ‘the move will make the threat of terrorism worse” (“Closing Dadaab refugee camp 
will worsen terrorism, Somalia tells Kenya,” n.d.). The matter is yet to be resolved. The problem 
with geographical-focused crackdowns is that, they evoke public criticisms that police are 
violating civil liberties compared to offense-specific crackdowns (Sherman, 1990) In Eastleigh, 
critics argued that police “antagonized a segment of the local community” (IPOA, 2014, p. 7) 
used excessive measures (Republic of Kenya-UNDP, 2015, p. 7) and “targeted swoop operations 
which are over-securitized and over-militarized” (Atta-Asamoah, 2015, p.13).  
Interestingly, public perception about terrorism has equally evolved over time. Initially, 




terrorism between Al-Qaeda and either America or Israel (Republic of Kenya, 2013; Lind and 
Howell, 2010; Whitaker, 2008; Barkan, 2004). Thus, America faced “resistance” from GK which 
accused the Bush Administration of preoccupation with the GWOT at the expense of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and criminality that had plagued Kenya (Whitaker, 2008; Krause and 
Otenyo, 2005; Barkan, 2004). Until recently, Kenyan Government Officials equally dismissed 
the involvement of Kenyans in extremist groups (Botha, 2014; Whitaker, 2008). In the aftermath 
of the Mpeketoni attack for instance, the militants claimed responsibility for the attack (Lind, 
Mutahi and Ooserom, 2015; Flood, 2014) but President Kenyatta maintained that it ‘was not an 
al-Shabaab attack [rather] local political networks were involved in the planning and execution 
of a heinous crime’ (Flood and Omar, 2014). Scholars too associated terrorism with Somalia-
Kenyans and al-Shabaab as a Somalia-based problem. Rosenau (2005) concluded that Kenya and 
Tanzania were “unpromising grounds” for recruitment to global jihad. Taken into historical 
context, such perceptions were sensible considering the relatively long-term political stability of 
Kenya in a conflict-ridden East Africa. Not anymore. Today, there is a relative consensus that al-
Shabaab insurgency is the source of terrorism in the country (Republic of Kenya, 2013).  
Al-Shabaab or Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahideen (Cilliers, 2015; Menkhaus, 2014; 
Republic of Kenya, 2013; “Al Shabaab in Somalia”, n.d.) means the “The Youth”. Al-Shabaab 
was designated on March 18, 2008 by the US Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Designation of al-
Shabaab,” n.d.) ). It emerged around 2006 as a faction from the Islamic Union and the Islamic 
Courts Union to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somali (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009) and 
the Horn of Africa (Calliers, 2015). Initially, it had tremendous support from the local Somali 




warlords (“Al Shabaab in Somalia,” n.d.); Marchal, 2012). Between 2007 and 2008, it launched 
armed conflict against an Ethiopian military occupation of southern Somalia (Menkaush, 2014) 
thereby eliciting claims that it was a product of Ethiopian invasion. However, Stig Hansen 
explains that al-Shabaab was organized prior to the Ethiopian invasion (“Al Shabaab in 
Somalia,” n.d.). The UN Monitoring Group that reports on the implementation of multilateral 
sanctions against Somalia and Eritrea equally reported that it has a military wing with a clear 
chain of command, discipline and well-defined communication structures (UN Security Council, 
2011).  
This includes their secret police unit, Amniyat which is a major threat to AMISOM and 
Somali government due to its intelligence capabilities (Menkhaus, 2014). Brutal and lethal, the 
group is akin to the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi led Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Boko 
Haram in Nigeria because they all provide a form of justice through strict Sharia laws (Zenn, 
2014; Jones, 2013; Walker, 2012) including stoning of women accused of committing adultery. 
They have thousands of fighters including FTFs, with al-Shabaab having over 14,000 in 2011 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013), over 20, 000 fighters in ISIS (Barrett, 2014; UN Security Council, 
2014), and over 15,000 in Boko Haram (Zenn, 2014). Harnisch (2010) said that about 100 young 
graduate students from Britain joined al-Shabaab, while Jones (2013) found that FTFs in al-
Shabaab mainly came from the U.S. between 2001 and 2010.  
ISIS and al-Shabaab engage in “taxation” and extortion for their survival (Menkhaus, 
2014; UN Security Council, 2011). Reports indicate that from 2012, over 4 million sacks of 
charcoal valued at US$ 60 million were discovered in Kismayo and Barawe region suspected to 
be belonging to the militia (Keatinge, 2014). In 2011, the group had annual revenue of $70-100 




$ 1,645,000 for ISIS (UN Security Council, 2014). In Kenya, its franchise, the Al Hijra (Muslim 
Youth Centre) is responsible for recruitment (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015; Menkhaus, 
2014). The franchise generates funds from its ownership of rental land (plots) in Majengo slum 
and Gikomba Market near Eastleigh, and money from the Gulf African Bank owned by 
Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (UN Security Council, 2011).  
With globalization, online networking for terrorist groups to enhance their radicalization 
and recruitment has become easy (NCTC, 2016; Cilliers, 2015; Briggs and Feve, 2013; 
Sageman, 2008; Silber and Bhatt, 2007) which presents another threat to Kenya. In fact, “Al 
Shabaab in Somalia” (n.d.) indicates that Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are “somehow liaising 
with each other” after 70 Boko Haram members received training in Somalia. From March 2015, 
Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader pledged his group’s allegiance to ISIS (Cilliers, 2015, p. 
18; Lind and Dowd, 2015). Rift Valley Institute reported that from 2010, Al Shabaab “leaders 
harboured aspirations to establish a regional presence and recruit fighters from across countries 
in eastern Africa who had an understanding of their respective countries’ vulnerabilities” ( 
(“Violent Extremism and Community Resilience | Rift Valley Institute,” n.d.)(“Violent 
Extremism in Kenya | Rift Valley Institute,” n.d.) p.2). Notably, ISIS has not succeeded in 
winning the support of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab which has instead warned it to “back 
off from East Africa” (“Al-Shabab wants IS to back off in East Africa - BBC News,” n.d.). 
Arguably, this supremacy stalemate may soon be thing of the past.  
Regardless, Al-Shabaab under the leadership of Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah (Ahmed 
Diriye) has shown renewed “capabilities” (Menkhaus, 2014) including commando-style ambush 
and sparing Muslims while killing Christians as was the case during Westgate and Marsabit bus 




its internal power wrangles rising from their inter-clan feuds (Cilliers, 2015; Hansen, 2014), Al 
Shabaab has transcended its predicted downfall by Somali President who observed that the death 
of Godane in a U.S. strike on September 1, 2014 meant “Al-Shabaab was collapsing” ( “U.S. 
confirms death of al Shabaab leader Godane in Somalia strike,” n.d.). Instead, the group remains 
“both weaker and more dangerous” (Menkhaus, 2014), resilient (“Al Shabaab in Somalia,” n.d.), 
lethal (Jones, 2013) and a serious threat to Kenya (NCTC, 2016; “U.N. report,” n.d.; “U.S. 
confirms death of al Shabaab leader Godane in Somalia strike,” n.d.).  
In summary, militarized CT are important will continue despite there being CVE 
programs in Kenya (“Rehab for ex-combatants,” n.d.). However, military operation alone is not 
sufficient for tackling al-Shabaab. CT operations may in fact increase the risk of VE activity, 
undermine community resilience (Metre, 2016) or may be exploited by Al-Shabaab for further 
recruitment. The African Union (2015) observation that “There are no easy solutions to a 
guerrilla type asymmetrical warfare [but] a multipronged and multi-stakeholder approach” (p. 5) 
is the entry point of the amnesty-driven CVE in Kenya. Likewise, the ICCT the Hague observed 
that “rehabilitation and reintegration is a complex field and it is important to have a cross-
disciplinary team involved” (“ICCT/UNICRI Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: 
Executive Summary and Good Practices Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.) 
Case Study: Amnesty and Reintegration Program 
Amnesty, a pardon for political offenders by the government in lieu of criminal 
prosecution is not a new phenomenon, but nonetheless rare in Kenya. In the 1950s during the 
struggle for independence from the British Colonization, media reports indicated that  




carrying the death penalty if they surrender voluntarily to the security forces. These 
offenses include membership in a Mau Mau gang, aiding the Mau Mau and illegal 
possession of arms. Terrorists already wanted for, murder and other atrocities are still 
liable for prosecution (British Hopes Rise for Peace in Kenya, 1953, para. 1).  
Following the 2004 signing of the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and 
Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, 
and the 2005 Nairobi Protocol Best Practice Guidelines, GK extended amnesty to illicit firearm 
holders in bandit prone areas as part of its Disarmament Operation. The aim of the operation was 
to curb the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons flooding the country through 
the porous borders and under policed Kenya-Somalia border (ISSAfrica.org, 2010. Result has 
been the massive public destructions of illicit firearms such as the 8,000 firearms burned in 2007 
(“Kenya burns illegal weapons haul”, 2007). Critics contend that the disarmament operation is 
marred with human rights violations by national security agencies, which has hindered 
involvement of the affected communities (Institute of Security Studies, 2010).  
While Kenya previously extended amnesty to al Shabaab in 2011 after Operation Linda 
Nchi began in Somalia, the launch of ARP in April 14, 2015 was puzzling. Put into context, the 
amnesty was announced at a time when the country was yet to internalize the effects of the 
deadly Garissa University College attack, and the Westgate Mall siege both of which led to 
massive loss of innocent lives. However, the government was in a dilemma of how to deal with 
the increasing numbers of returnees estimated to 1,500 already in the country. This led to the 
radical decision to shift from hard-militarized CT including raids/crackdowns (see “Kenya police 




seize explosives,” n.d.; “Kenya police seize weapons in Mombasa mosques raid - BBC News,” 
n.d.) to “soft” amnesty-driven CVE. 
While announcing the ARP, General Nkaissery directed that ‘all who had gone to 
Somalia for training and wished to disassociate with terrorism should report to the National 
Government offices’ in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa (Ombati, 2015). He warned, ‘those who 
fail to heed this call within the prescribed time frame will be treated as criminals and will face 
the full force of the law’. In so doing, he urged parents or guardians with missing children, or 
who suspect that their children have been radicalized or killed in Somalia to report to police. He 
further warned, “Failure to report will lead to presumption that they are aware and condone or 
are party to the terrorist training with attendant criminal consequences”. In response, the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya argued that “Any blanket amnesty is ridiculous and an 
affirmation that the Government is officially abetting terrorism," (Kibet, 2015), whiles some 
Muslim leaders expressed their skepticism in the amnesty citing lack of an amnesty law.  
ARP was offered to radicalized youth on condition that they voluntarily surrender to the 
national security agencies including County Commissioners and Police, for purposes of 
reintegration. In exchange for their surrender, youths are provided with training, psychological 
counselling, and social services to assist them in their desistance from VE. The program is 
implemented by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, a multi-agency of the national security 
forces which are pulling levers with non-state actors like donors and community/religious 
leaders. To prevent recidivism and infiltration of the program by insincere returnees, NCTC 
subjects returnees to a vetting process and continued monitoring before and after reintegration. 
Reformed returnees are also provided with “reintegration kits” which includes items like sowing 




300 returnees surrendered for the reintegration process. Due to lack of empirical study about it 
that is publicly available, previous CVE research were reviewed to understand some of the 
opportunities and challenges in CVE. 
Previous Research on CVE  
CVE has become a buzz word in terrorism studies over the last decade. It originates 
within terrorism scholarship but lacks consensus in its definition. Terrorism itself lacks a 
universal definition (Tilly, 2004; Ganor, 2002; Hmoud, 2006; Jackson, 2008; Schmid, 2012). 
Definition of terrorism takes many dimensions including moral argument (Jackson, 2008), 
normative argument (Tilly, 2004; Ganor, 2002; Ward, 2003), rational choice theory (Altran, 
2012) and social bond theory (Sageman, 2008). In Kenya, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 
2012 does not define the term terrorism but rather defines a “terrorist act as,  
an act or threat of action a) which involves the use of violence against person, endangers 
the life of a person, other than the person committing the action, results in serious 
damage to property, involves the use of firearms or explosives, prejudices national 
security or public safety, and, b) which is carried out with the aim of intimidating or 
causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public (p. 6-7).   
Whether definition of terrorism is “impossible” (Jackson, 2008) or necessary remains 
debatable. In agreement with Jackson (2008), the dissertation retained the term terrorism, to 
reflect the definition in POTA. Elsewhere, Holmer defined CVE as “a realm of policy, programs, 
interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical 
political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups” (Holmer, 2013, p. 2). McCants 
and Watts (2012) defined it as measures to “reduce the number of terrorist group supporters 




As already aforementioned, CVE programs take a community-based and multi-
stakeholder approach. The U.S. Department of State identifies four key areas of CVE 
programming. They include capacity building of government and civil society to engage in CVE 
plans, strengthening CVE efforts by local actors, enhancing the role of civil society in CVE 
efforts, counter-messaging to change the narratives of radicalized youths, and addressing 
radicalization through the criminal justice system through police-community engagement 
(“Programs and Initiatives”, n.d.). 
Evidently, CVE has expanded around the world, since 2003 when the UK Government 
initiated its CVE strategy dubbed CONTEST. The aim of CONTEST was to deal with the Al 
Qa’ida terrorism threats. CONTEST entailed four pillars namely; Prevent, Pursue, Protect and 
Prepare. Prevent pillar matches ARP. Prevent which meant to “stop and prevent people from 
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” (Carlile, 2011, p. 39). It had three objectives; 
ideological challenge, supporting vulnerable people, and working with key sectors with risks of 
radicalization (Carlile, 2011). Evaluators argued that it improved cooperation between police and 
communities on security matters, despite criticisms that Prevent led to “greater mistrust of the 
police” (Klausen, 2009), greater marginalization of Muslim communities (Awan, 2012), and 
labelling/spying of Muslims as ‘suspect communities’ (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011) or 
susceptible to terrorist involvement (Thomas, 2010). Notably, Prevent was reviewed in 2011 but 
found no evidence of spying Muslims (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). Reviewers however 
cautioned “Prevent is not a police program and it must not become one” (Carlile, 2011, p. 10).  
The U.S. CVE strategy - Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism- was 
initiated in 2011. Like Prevent, it took a community-based approach. It aims at “preventing 




individuals or groups in the U.S. to commit acts of violence” (“Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States | Homeland Security,” n.d., p. 3). U.S. Strategy 
focuses on three key areas; 1) “enhancing federal engagement with and support to local 
communities that may be targeted by VE” 2) capacity building for law enforcement through 
continuous research on VE, and 3) countering VE propaganda while promoting the American 
ideals (p. 6). Experts however suggest that the U.S. government to stop the focus on vulnerable 
populations, reduce sympathy for terrorist organizations to reduce support, offer amnesty for 
criminals, and that CVE should be implemented by one lead agency (McCants &Watts, 2012). 
France however rejected collaborating with Muslim communities in CT and continued with 
arrests and extradition (Klausen, 2008). Romaniuk (2015) found that Burkina Faso is vulnerable 
to VE though the threat was not looming due to their resilience. He stressed the need to “avoid 
stigmatizing communities, send clear messages about what CVE is, and [foster] relationships 
between government agencies and civil society groups” (p. 17-19).  
 CVE garnered increasing attention in Kenya since 2011. The USAID Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI)’s Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) was a pilot CVE program launched between 
2011 and 2013 in Eastleigh and later, to Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa (Khalil & 
Zeuthen, 2014). Individuals and groups that participated in the program received small grants to 
support activities like counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder. Critics however felt that 
America was interfering with religious affairs after U.S. engaged in pedagogical training for 
madrasas (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014).  
Reviewers noted “some grants failed to access the most vulnerable” (p. 41). They 
reiterated that the program would have benefited from a more comprehensive understanding of 




Extremism Horn of Africa programme (STRIVE HoA), a pilot CVE project implemented in 
Nairobi by Royal United Services Institute from January 2014-January 2017 (also see Union, 
2016). It focused on four key areas; capacity building for law enforcement, strengthening 
capacity of women in CVE, role of Diaspora Somalis, and increasing the understanding of the 
drivers of radicalization among youth in Kenya (Zeuthen, 2015). Results showed that all youths 
are vulnerable to extremism. The sample however was bias as it focused on women leaders and 
excluded women that were directly affected by the violence.  
Lessons from Amnesty-Driven CVEs  
As aforementioned, there is scarcity of empirical evidence about ARP but lessons from 
other countries with similar CVE programs were reviewed to inform the author (“Lessons from 
other countries | The Star, Kenya,” n.d.). In the 1990s, Uganda granted public demand for an 
amnesty for Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (“Undermining the LRA,” 
2012). LRA rebels have ruled Northern Uganda for over twenty years. The amnesty was meant 
to facilitate national reconciliation and cohesion.  
It was legislated in Uganda Amnesty Act of 2000, and implemented by the Uganda 
Amnesty Commission. It focused on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. It 
required the rebels (reporters or returnees) to renounce the insurgency by downing their arms, 
and surrendering to the army or police voluntarily (Ssenyonjo, 2005). Approximately 20,000 
reporters surrendered, and received reinsertion kits to aid in their reintegration (Ssenyonjo, 
2005). In May 2012, the government eliminated the wholesale amnesty through a legal 
amendment (“Undermining the LRA,” 2012; Agger, 2012).  Ssenyonjo (2005) observes that 
LRA members deserved amnesty because they were children at the time they were coerced or 




prevent returnees from facing stigmatization upon reintegration (Fleming, 2006). Notably, none 
of the top five LRA commanders surrendered.  
In 2014, Somalia Government initially offered Al-Shabaab terrorists 45 days’ amnesty to 
surrender to enhance peace and reconciliation process (“Somalia offers al-Shabab members 
amnesty,” 2014); (“Somalia offers amnesty to al-Shabab fighters - Al Jazeera English,” n.d.) ). 
Somalia President Sheikh Mohamud explained that defectors undergo a process of ‘monitoring 
by Somali security forces to prevent recidivism (Billow and Joseph, 2015). Observers however, 
felt that the screening process was weak, and that Al-Shabaab were taking advantage to infiltrate 
the security forces (“Giving Extremists a Second Chance | Inter Press Service,” n.d.).  
After initially failed  attempts to grant amnesty to Boko Haram militants, Nigerian 
government in 2011 set up the Presidential Committee which proposed amnesty to members of 
Boko Haram willing to surrender and a comprehensive socio-economic strategy to address 
people’s needs (ISSAfrica.org, 2011). Critics however were skeptical that it would not succeed 
due to the radical views of Boko Haram. Likewise, former Nigerian President Jonathan 
Goodluck observed that the amnesty for the Niger Delta militants was poorly timed and 
repentant militants continued to surrender beyond the deadline, nearly rendering the program 
endless (“President Jonathan On Two-Day Working Visit to Borno, Yobe States, Rules Out 
Amnesty for Terrorists,” n.d.). 
Most recently in 2016, the Colombian Government extended amnesty to the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) rebels to end the rebellion that dates to the 
1960s, and has claimed over 260,000 lives (“Colombia signs peace deal with FARC - CNN,” 
n.d.; Casey, 2016). The amnesty exempts FARC guerrilla rebels accused of minor crimes who 




2016 by those who viewed it as lenient before it was ratified by Congress on 1 December 
(“Colombia,” n.d.). The new deal is based on transitional justice requiring FARC members to 
declare and return their assets for compensation of their victims. The deal is not enshrined in the 
Colombia's Constitution.  
In brief, CVE is context-specific (Romaniuk, 2015; European Commission, 2015; Khalil 
& Zeuthen, 2014; Holmer, 2013) but we do not know whether they work or don’t work 
(Romaniuk, 2015). While CVE is a community-based strategy, application of community 
policing strategy to CVE has not always translated into winning hearts and minds of 
communities to collaborate with security agencies in CVE due to mistrust. Instead, the exclusive 
implementation of CVE in Muslim dominated communities creates the impression that Muslims 
are discriminatively targeted as the potential terrorists. Amnesty-driven CVEs are subject to key 
challenges including the risk of infiltration by insincere returnees, mistrust among stakeholders, 
risk of recidivism, insecurity of returnees which directly influence the extent to which police 















Conceptual framework helps the researcher to figure out what and why could be going on 
in the intended study. As Maxwell (2013) puts it, it is “a tentative theory of the phenomena that 
you are investigating” (p. 39). Maxwell (2013) suggests four ways to construct a conceptual 
framework: your experiential knowledge, existing theory and research, your pilot and 
exploratory research; and thought experiments. The study did not test any criminological theory. 
Instead, process evaluation utilized FD framework as a lens for assessing theoretical similarities 
between FD and ARP. Also included were theoretical explanations of radicalization and police 
perception studies to understand some of the challenges of CVE.  
Theoretical Explanations of Radicalization and Disengagement  
After 9/11, terrorism scholars began to shift focus from “causes of terrorism” to 
radicalization process, a concept defined as “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in 
directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 
428). Though not criminal, radicalization is a precursor to VE participation (Berger, 2016). 
Radicalization within al-Shabaab has changed substantially from targeting ethnic Somali 
community, to rendering all youths from marginalized parts of Kenya vulnerable to 
radicalization (Patterson, 2015; Botha, 2014; UN Security Council, 2011).  
National Television (NTV) Kenya, found that the militia is “aggressively recruiting and 
the criteria had since expanded from young Somalis and Arabs to just about anyone who was 
committed to the cause -- from any background” (“How al Shabaab recruitment agents lure 
Kenyans - Daily Nation,” n.d.) Indeed, most of the terrorist attacks in Kenya including Westgate 




Precisely, Kenya’s Military spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir, confirmed via Twitter that 
the Westgate attackers were “Abu Baara al-Sudani, Omar Nabhan, Khattab al-Kene and Umayr” 
(“Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” 2014; “Four Kenya attack suspects named,” n.d.). In 
October 2011, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, a native Muslim Kenyan and a member of al-Shabaab also 
killed six people in Nairobi. The UN reported that Kenyans “constitute the largest and most 
structurally organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabaab” (UN Security Council, 2011, p. 
24). In this regard, Botha and Abdile (2014) argues Kenya should “move away from the 
perception that only Somalis and Somali-Kenyans are involved with al-Shabaab” (p. 16).  
Explanations or drivers for radicalization process include push and pull factors.  
The USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism describes “push factors” as those 
characteristics of the societal environment that allegedly help thrust vulnerable individuals onto 
the path of violence) (USAID, 2009, p. 9). USAID identified repressive regimes with records of 
gross violations of human rights, and poorly governed or ungoverned borders, and denial of basic 
political rights as some of the push factors to VE. USAID also explains that “pull factors may be 
financial such as the “many and diverse rewards which membership in a group or movement, and 
participation in its activities, may confer” (p. 9).  
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) presented twelve mechanisms of radicalization 
process but concluded that there is no single pathway to the process. Marc Sageman in 
Leaderless Jihad, coined the “bunch of guys theory” to argue that today’s global salafis are 
formed via the web. The web offers a platform for radicalization due to loose-knit social bonds 
found in kinships and friendship (Sageman, 2008). It is his argument that social bonds usually 




from 172 jihadists to 500 profiles is “vaguely identified” (Hoffman, 2008) and lack a control 
group (Kundnani, 2012).  
 Like Sageman, a New York Police Department (NYPD) study concluded that jihadi-
Salafi ideology is the key driver of radicalization in the West. Frustrated individuals “seek other 
like-minded individuals and form a loose-knit group or social network” (Silber and Bhatt, p.16). 
NYPD identified four stages of radicalization beginning with “pre-radicalization”. Next is “self-
identification” where they begin to explore Salafi Islam and associate themselves with like-
minded individuals”. Third is “indoctrination” phase when an “individual progressively 
intensifies his beliefs and wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology”. The final state is “jihadization” 
phase in which the “members accept their individual duty to participate in jihad” (Silber & Bhatt, 
p. 6). NYPD posits that one must complete the four phases to engage in the planning or 
implementation of a terrorist act. While the authors argue that these stages can predict 
radicalization, others maintain that predictability is not possible (Denoeux and Carter, 2009; 
Holmer, 2013).  
A 2016 report by the National Institute for Justice comparing 119 lone-wolf terrorists/ 
lone actors with other kinds of mass murderers for example found no profile of lone-actor 
terrorists (“Video Transcript,” n.d.). Instead, results revealed a wide ideological diversity among 
the group namely, religious lone wolves, extreme right-wing lone wolves who are anti-
government, and single-issue terrorists. In 2017, UNDP Africa examined root causes of 
extremism in Africa based on 350 interviews with former violent extremists in African countries 
including Kenya (Yahya, 2017). Preliminary results suggest that extremist groups tailor their 
message for potential recruits owing to their vulnerability for example, job offers for the poor 




Many scholars agree that key drivers to radicalization and VE in Kenya are salafi 
ideology, marginalization, youth unemployment, and porous Kenyan-Somali Border (NCTC, 
2016; Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016; Metre, 2016; UNDP Kenya, 2015; Menkhaus, 2015; Patterson, 
2015; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014; KNCHR, 2014; Republic of Kenya, 2013; Ranstorp and 
Hyllengren, 2013; Barkan, 2004). Patterson (2015) explained that unemployment pushed many 
Muslims to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 80s during the oil boom. They later returned with 
stricter (‘pure’) interpretations of Islam that conflicted with the Islamic faith in Kenya (Patterson, 
2005) which they in turn transmitted to the youth in mosques and madrassas (Villa-Vicencio, 
Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey, 2016).  
In her fieldwork in East Africa, Anneli Botha interviewed 238 members of four militant 
and terrorist groups (al-Shabaab, the Mombasa Republican Council, the Allied Democratic 
Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army) as well as 47 close family members to generate their 
biographical profiles (Schmid, 2015). Her point of departure was the question of one mother why 
one of her sons became a policeman and the other a terrorist. Her variables included primary 
(family, friends, school) and secondary (e.g. media) socialization agents and their influence on 
the development of radicalisation in Uganda and Kenya. She argued that “those who joined 
militant organisations had lost trust in the fairness of the political system and had often 
experienced at close quarters instances of indiscriminate repression (mass arrests, torture) from 
the security forces” (Schmid, 2015). 
Notably, in 2008, Kenya had over two million youths (individuals aged between 18 to 
less than 35) without formal jobs thereby increasing vulnerability of youths to radicalization and 
recruitment (KNCHR, 2014; Waki Report, 2008). Of course, “correlations between structural 




factual that poverty does not cause terrorism because there are many poor people who never 
resort to violence (Metre, 2016; Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014; Venhaus, 2010). Instead, terrorists such 
as the cyberjihadist Younis Tsouli, the son of a Moroccan diplomat in London had middle-class 
backgrounds (Denoeux and Carter, 2009; Sageman, 2008).  
Marginalization has been blamed for the emergence of Mombasa Republican Council 
(MRC), a radical group that has been agitating for the secession of Coast from Kenya under the 
slogan, “Pwani Si Kenya” (Coast is not Kenya) (Willis and Chome, 2014). In 2013, they 
threatened to disrupt the general elections citing their historical grievances over access to land 
and employment (Willis & Gona, 2013). Lind & Dowd (2015) observed that despite there being 
no link between MRC and Al-Shabaab, historical under-development has rendered the region 
conducive to the spread of violence. Donors have equally reiterated that GK should address 
inequality such as difficulty to obtain national identity cards, land issues, and marginalization 
(European Commission, 2015; UNDP, 2016; (“SUPKEM Countering Violent Extremism 
Workshop,” 2016) in its effort to address VE.  
Considering that, not all terrorists remain engaged to terrorist organizations for life, CVE 
interventions such as ARP target individual terrorists who might chose to walk away from the 
militant groups. Criminologists are familiar with rational choice theory, the argument that 
offenders are rational thinkers capable of weighing the cost-benefits of their criminal behavior 
(Jacobs, 2010; Stafford & Warr, 1993). In like manner, proponents of disengagement programs 
assume that individual terrorists can reach a turning point in their violent life when they 
rationally weigh the merits versus demerits of their continued involvement in VE and may 
choose to disengage “leave a terrorist organization” when they are provided with better 




‘deradicalized’ (Horgan, 2014; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). This opportunity to drift between 
VE and non-VE behavior presents a challenge to ARP due to possibility of being infiltrated by 
insincere returnees.  
As Horgan & Altier (2012) observed, physical or psychological disengagement from 
terrorism can be either voluntary or involuntary, but we do not know how many terrorists 
disengage because of being apprehended, and how many volunteer for help. They argued, 
“repentant and voluntary disengaged terrorist” can help counter VE by reducing the attraction of 
new terrorists (p. 84). There are “push” and “pull” factors to disengagement but there is no single 
cause of disengagement (Altier, 2017; Horgan et al., 2016; Horgan, 2008). In this regard, Horgan 
(2008) noted that individual disengagement from terrorism may be the result of an individual or 
collective process (or combination of both). Disengagement is sometimes attributed to 
experiences including role change and attitudinal shift (p. 5). Altier (2017) also asserted that 
disillusionment, disagreements within the group, dissatisfaction with one’s role, and burnout are 
common drivers to disengagement.  
According to Horgan (2008), individuals can disengage voluntarily when they no longer 
find value to continue being a member of terrorist group, or involuntarily like when an individual 
is forced to leave due to external pressure such as the reality of decommissioning or some new 
legislative initiative (p. 5). Elsewhere, Barrelle has coined the term “natural disengagement” to 
argue that most extremists naturally and successfully, without any help, disengage from 
extremism albeit their struggles with transition back to society. Barrelle argues that sustained 
disengagement is dependent on how well the person engages with the society afterwards. 




Notably, many Kenyan youths were falsely lured to join Al Shabaab by financial 
promises as much as 40,000 Kenyan Shillings (400 USD) per month (Amble and Meleagrou-
Hitchens, 2014). The result is the return of at least 700 returnees in Kenya. The International 
Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) established, that either they 
mainly defected due to disillusionment as the money they were promised, was in vain or al-
Shabaab teachings contradicted Islamic beliefs (“ICSR Insight - Al-Shabaab,” 2012). In short, 
definition of radicalization itself is problematic or “a source of confusion” as Sedgwick (2010) 
puts it. Whether radicalization differs for women and men, or whether it can be predicted is also 
contentious. Radicalization is however context-specific.  
Police Perceptions Perspectives    
CVE programs are ambitious and expanding tremendously around the world. Despite 
there being no conclusive evidence about their effectiveness, many governments have adopted 
CVE. Of course, the donor contribution to CVE interventions is significant, and that raises 
concern as to whether countries including Kenya, are embracing CVE due to donor pressure 
(“Programs and Initiatives”, n.d.; “BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; 
“BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March 2016.pdf,” n.d.; Union, 2016). The US 
Department of State for instance endeavors to “strengthen the capabilities of government and 
non-governmental actors to …promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals caught 
in the cycle of radicalization to violence” (“Programs and Initiatives”, n.d). Thus, there is need to 
understand perception of police officers on various aspects of CVE is critical. Understanding 
police perception about CVE programs is important because they are key players in 




Considering police subculture, officers can be resistant, suspicious and skeptical towards 
organizational changes such as CVE interventions (Skogan, 2008).  
Lurigio and Skogan (1994) assessed perceptions of police officers regarding community 
policing (CP) in Chicago Police Department (CPD). They measured perception before and after 
the implementation of Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) in 1993. They measured 
perception in terms of officers’ job satisfaction, their relationships with peers and supervisors, 
and their opinions regarding CP (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994). Surveys were handed to the 
participants during training sessions. On top of each survey, was a letter from CPD’s 
Superintendent stating his support for the evaluation and reassuring officers of the confidentiality 
of their responses. They argued “the success of community policing depends on the police 
officers who are responsible for implementing the programs. Their attitudes, perceptions, and 
behaviors, must be substantially changed before [CP] can be put into practice (p. 315).  
Elsewhere, Stewart and Morris (2009) surveyed 208 Texas Police Chiefs about their 
perceptions of Homeland Security as the dominant police strategy, and the factors that influence 
those perceptions. The primary source of data involved self-administered surveys of police chiefs 
attending the Texas Police Chief Leadership Series (TPCLS) and the New Chief Development 
Program (NCDP). Police perception was measured as risk, preparedness, agency type, and 
agency size, based on 4-point Likert scale. They found that Chiefs of very small departments are 
more likely to report homeland security as their dominant strategy compared to chiefs of larger 
departments. The present study replicated their measure of perception. While their study 
incorporated one cadre (police chiefs), the dissertation improved on it by incorporating five 





Elsewhere, Poteyeva and Sun (2009) reviewed 33 studies that examined police attitudes 
from 1990-2006. Most of the studies showed no gender difference in attitudes toward various 
police practices such as community policing, arrest or use of force. They argued that 
“occupational socialization is more powerful in molding officers’ traits and attitudes than gender 
predisposition” (Poteyeva & Sun, 2009). Their review included multivariate regression analyses 
but no qualitative study. The present study has thus incorporated both qualitative and quantitative 
studies.   
Most recently, Sytsma and Piza (2017) surveyed 178 Toronto Police Officers. They 
compared a specialized community-oriented policing (COP) unit to a reactive unit on officer 
perceptions of public contact and officer perceptions of job performance. They also compared 
bicycle patrol officers to motor vehicle patrol officers within these units. Findings suggest that 
“officers within a COP unit” and are more likely to rate higher on perceptions of performing job 
duties in a procedurally just manner compared to the reactive unit. They stressed the importance 
of upper management communicating the benefits of community driven policing to rank-and-file 
police officers delivering these services. Methodologically, they used purposive sample that 
hindered generalizability of their findings. The dissertation improved on this by using a 
probability sample. 
Focused Deterrence Technique   
Deterrence theory posits that for punishment to be effective, it must be “swift, severe, and 
certain” (Beccaria, 2009; Stafford and Warr, 1993). Deterrence (whether specific or general) 
presumes that crime is a choice and offenders are rational people capable of weighing the cost-
benefits of their criminal behavior (Jacobs, 2010; Stafford & Warr, 1993). FD/pulling levers 




to a relatively small group of chronic offenders and ensuring punishment swiftness and certainty 
(Braga & Weisburd, 2012). FD involves directly communicating incentives and disincentives to 
the targeted offenders (Braga, Apel &Welsh, 2013).  
David Kennedy in Police Innovations explains that pulling levers “strategies deploy 
enforcement, services, the moral voice of communities, and deliberate communication in order to 
create a powerful deterrent to particular behavior by particular offenders” (Kennedy, 2006, p. 
156). Implementers of FD directly and clearly warn targeted offenders that violence will no 
longer be tolerated. Offenders are offered new standards of behavior that they must comply with 
failure of which they are assured of swift and certain action involving criminal justice system 
agents. FD thus involves combining both hard and soft language from security agencies to 
criminal offenders (Braga & Weisburd, 2012, p. 7).  
FD strategies have been applied to high-risk offenders, especially street gangs and overt 
drug markets in America (Braga & Weisburd, 2012, p. 21). It was first applied to the Boston Gun 
Project initiated in 1996 to address gun violence in Boston (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl and Waring, 
2001). This was a joint effort of criminal justice agents and Harvard University researchers.  It 
was based on Problem-Oriented Policing utilizing the SARA Model (scanning, analysis, 
response, and assessment) and pulling levers strategy involving probation, police officers, 
streetworkers, clergy, and community-based organizations (Braga et al., 2001, p. 2). The Gun 
Project initiated the Operation Ceasefire which implemented the Project. Police sent direct 
message warning the targeted offenders during call-in meetings or fora, that violence will no 
longer be tolerated, and that those who violate the law, will be dealt swiftly by the criminal 




youth victimization, 32% decrease in shots-fired calls for service per month, and 25% decrease 
in gun assault incidents in Boston (Braga et al., 2001). 
FD relates to Cure Violence Health Model, a strategy that treats violence as a contagious 
health problem that can be treated. Cure Models like the Chicago-CeaseFire or Peace TXT 
project in Nairobi Kenya, are based on three elements: 1) detect and distrupt potentially violent 
conflicts; 2) identify and treat highest risk for involvement in violence; and 3) mobilize the 
community to change norms (“Essential Elements | Cure Violence,” n.d.; “PeaceTXT: Cure 
Violence Collaboration in Kenya,” n.d.; “Kenya covers up military massacre - CNN,” n.d.). 
Although proponents argued that TXT project was associated with low election violence in the 
Kariobangi slums during the 2013 general elections, the 2013 elections were peaceful 
countrywide. These models inherently suffer from lack of involvement from faith-based 
community organizations and community embeddedness” (Butts, Roman, Bostwick and Porter, 
2015, p. 45).  
In summary, ARP and FD differ in their implementation process but share key theoretical 
similarities. It is the social service aspect part of FD that relates to ARP. RAND researchers 
evaluated FD interventions using linear logic model to exam inputs (implementation processes, 
context and environment, and costs) and their relationship with short-term outputs, such as 
fidelity to the model, program implementation, engagement and support of the community 
(Saunders, Ober, Kilmer, and Greathouse, 2016, p.2). They concluded that without commitment 
from leadership within the local law enforcement department and the prosecutor’s office, it may 
not be possible to implement FD interventions (Saunders et al., 2016). Notably, little is known 
about application of FD to other crimes or settings, a gap that this dissertation has partly filled by 






The study site for the dissertation was Kenya and John Jay College for purposes of data 
collection and storage respectively. There were three scientific and ethical justifications for 
conducting this study in a foreign setting per CUNY research standards. First, the author is a 
Senior Superintendent of Police in the Kenya Police Service, a position that leveraged her access 
to rich data sources for the analysis, besides her knowledge of the local regulations of the NPS 
and Kenya (Appendix E). In March 2017, she passed the Collaborative Institutional Training 
Initiative (CITI) regarding protection of human subjects in research (Appendix K). As a PhD 
student, with a Master of Science in Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), 
she had adequate training in research methods. Besides, she attended a qualitative data analysis 
workshop on the use of Atlas.ti, at the Graduate Center in May 2017. Moreover, Mr. Eric 
Kiraithe, who was part of the author’s supervisory committee, is an Assistant Inspector General 
at NPS and audited the dissertation to ensure confirmability of data. The structure for the 
dissertation included both qualitative and quantitative data.  
Qualitative Study Design 
This was an exploratory case study of the ARP. A case study is a “research strategy in 
which the researcher’s attention centers on an in-depth examination of one or a few cases on 
many dimensions” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011, p. 447). The “investigator explores a bounded 
system (a case) or cases over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple 
sources of information (e.g. interviews, documents and reports) and reports a case description 
and case-based themes” (Creswell, 2006, p. 73). The term case study was used “not as a 




(Stake, 2005). Case study is “noninterventive [as] “we try not to disturb the ordinary activity of 
the case, not to test, nor even to interview, if we can get the information we want by observation 
or examination of records” (Stake, 1995, p. 12). Considering the sensitivity of ARP, the author 
neither sought identifying information about the returnees nor interviewed returnees. Although 
Sageman (2008) contends that literature on terrorism over relies on narrowly exploratory case 
studies and government sources, government remains the most reliable source of terrorism data 
in Kenya.  
 The qualitative research question asked, what does the Amnesty and Reintegration 
Program in Kenya entail? The objective was to conduct a process evaluation to understand the 
motivations for instituting ARP, level of “program integrity” on the ground, and see if it shares 
patterns with FD framework. Notably, a process evaluation helps in establishing “whether the 
program is implemented in a way which ensures that the mechanism is able to operate” (Butts, 
2011, p. 6; also see Chapman & Hough, 1998). Process evaluation framework was the lens used 
to assess the ongoing process of Kenya's move from hard to “soft” power using the amnesty 
policy as a case study. In other words, if FD is the mechanism that makes it work, how does the 
on-the-ground implementation of ARP measure up to the CVE model for Kenya, and what 
barriers stand in the way of its broader acceptance by the police doing the work?  
 Therefore, program integrity was reported if ARP was delivered as intended in theory and 
design using National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism as the process evaluation 
framework/model (NCTC, 2016). To assess if there was program integrity therefore, the model 
was coded into five themes namely problem identification, pulling levers, conducting research, 
reintegration services, communication. In details, the national CVE plan requires that the 




identification), launch a national Disengagement and Reintegration initiative, and monitor 
returnees to ensure that violent extremists do not penetrate the initiative (conducting research). 
Moreover, there should be coordination of training and capacity building at the local level by 
partner GK agencies (pulling levers). There must be psychological support and counselling 
programmes put in place to support returnees and their families (reintegration services). Further, 
the government must ensure that there is effective information sharing between government 
agencies about status of returnees (communication) and set up a training clearinghouse at the 
NCTC for security and GK agencies engaged in CT and CVE (Model 1). 
Table 1: Process Evaluation Models  
MODEL 1: KENYA’S NATIONAL CVE PLAN 
(NCTC, 2016) 
 
• Develop a legislative and policy framework 
covering returnees. 
• Launch a national Disengagement and 
Reintegration initiative and monitoring to 
ensure that this initiative is not penetrated by 
violent extremists.   
• Coordination of training and capacity building 
at the local level by partner GK agencies.    
• Psychological support and counselling 
programmes to returnees and their families. 
• Effective information sharing between 
government agencies about status of returnees.  
• A training clearinghouse at the NCTC for 
security and GK agencies engaged in CT and 
CVE. 
MODEL 2: FOCUSED DETERRENCE 
FRAMEWORK 
(Kennedy, 2006, p. 156). 
• Selection of a particular crime problem  
• Pulling together an interagency enforcement group 
(police, probation, parole, state and federal 
prosecutors  
• Conducting research by police officers to identify 
key offenders.  
• Framing of a special enforcement operation 
directed at those offenders and groups of 
offenders….using any and all legal tools (or 
levers) to sanction groups. 
• Matching of enforcement operations with parallel 
efforts to direct services and the moral voices of 
the affected communities  
• Communicating directly and repeatedly with 
offenders and groups to let them know that they 
are under particular scrutiny, and what they can do 
to avoid enforcement action  
 
 In addition, theoretical similarities between ARP and FD was assessed using FD 
framework provided by Kennedy (2006). The dissertation thus coded the framework into five the 
themes (problem identification, conducting research, pulling levers, reintegration services, and 
communication). Precisely, Kennedy describes FD framework that begins with the selection of a 




interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners, who then conduct research to 
identify chronic offenders or groups of offenders (“conducting research”). Then, they frame a 
response to offenders and groups of offenders using all available tools for sanctions (“pulling 
levers”) to stop their continued engagement in violent behavior. After this, you focus social 
services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement 
prevention efforts (“reintegration services”). Finally, implementers must directly and repeatedly 
communicate with the offenders so that they may understand why they are receiving this special 
attending and the consequences if their subsequent behavior or misbehavior (“communication”) 
(p. 156).  
 Process evaluation was achieved through content analysis, which is the systematic study 
of messages and their meanings (see Graneheim & Lundman, 2003). Content analysis is 
appropriate for answering what, to whom, why, how, which formed the bulk of this study. It also 
reduces data, is systematic, and very flexible because it is applicable to qualitative, quantitative 
or mixed-methods studies or used in inductive and deductive analysis (Carley 1993). A previous 
study that used content analysis in police studies include Maguire, Uchida and Hassell (2010) 
that analyzed 753 police cases reports. They coded the cases/content into six measures of 
Problem-Oriented Policing (POP): the scope and the type of the problem, how it was nominated, 
how it was resolved, what agencies were involved, and how closely the officers followed the 
SARA process (p. 76).  
 Overall, qualitative research helps in “understanding the process by which events and 
actions take place” (Maxwell, 2013, p.30) or “exploring new issues, and investigating hard-to-
study groups” in this case, security agents (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 300). Jenkins (2015) 




and enhance the research relationships of police academics and practitioners” (p. 502). 
Importantly, qualitative research can “integrate quantitative survey data to offer a holistic 
understanding of the phenomenon being studied” (Baster & Jack, 2008). Figure 2 is an 
interactive model showing the qualitative research design for the dissertation (Maxwell, 2013).  















 The two sources of qualitative data were Content analysis and “NCTC Sample” Survey. 
Data collection for the documents to be used in the content analysis began in 2016. Precisely, 
From December 21, 2016 to January 9, 2017, the researcher visited Kenya on a trip funded by 
Dr. James Fyfe Fellowship to facilitate preliminary data collection of official GK documents on 
GOALS 
• Process evaluation of 
terrorism Amnesty and 
Reintegration Program 
• To determine program 
integrity 
• To determine theoretical 
similarities of amnesty 




• Own background in 
policing 
• Literature on previous 
amnesty-driven CVEs 




• Survey, open-ended 
questionnaires 
• Content analysis (Media 
content and government 
documents) 
• Qualitative research 
• Inductive & iterative 
analysis 
• Thematic coding 
 
VALIDITY 
• Triangulation of 
sources, methods 
• Member checks 
• Researcher Bias 
• Auditing 
• Confirmability  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
What does the amnesty and 





ARP, and gain insight into the program. It had become impossible to discuss details of the 
amnesty program via phone due to the sensitivity of terrorism making the trip necessary. During 
the visit, the author learnt that contrary to the previous claims that Anti-Terrorist Police Unit 
(ATPU) implemented ARP, NCTC was the implementer. As a result, it became clear that 
obtaining primary documents from NCTC would be difficult which led to the decision to 
incorporate newspapers.  
These included online newspapers from the Standard Digital, The Star, Daily Nation, 
AllAfrica, Aljazeera, Capital Blog, and Strategic Intelligence Service.  In addition, GK document 
were retrieved from its ministerial websites namely the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of 
National Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kenya News Agency. The rest of the data 
were collected from websites of foreign embassies and agencies that have some working 
relationship with GK. These included United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Kenya, 
International Centre for Counter-terrorism (ICCT)-The Hague, U.S. Department of State, U.S. 
Embassy Nairobi, BRICS East Africa, Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS), 
European Commission, Catham House, and Rift Valley Institute. 
The leading search engine was Google. A few primary documents came from the Kenya 
Police. Besides, a journalist (Dominic Wabala) from The Star newspaper was surveyed due to his 
familiarity with ARP based on his previous interview with the NCTC Director, Ambassador 
Julius Kimani (“The war against terror will define our generation - Kimani | The Star, Kenya,” 
n.d.). He completed an open-ended questionnaire, which later became part of the Primary 
Documents. Although Wabala completed a non-signature consent form to ensure his anonymity, 
he later permitted the author via WhatsApp text to acknowledge him by name in the dissertation. 




amnesty, Karanja Kibicho amnesty, Al-shabaab reintegration, al Shabaab returnees, CVE 
Conference Kenya, rehabilitating terrorists Kenya, foreign fighters Kenya. The advantage of data 
from agency records is that they do not require direct interaction with research subjects and are 
useful in exploratory studies (Maxfiled & Babbie, 2011). Although internet makes data 
collection from open sources easy (Parkin and Green, 2016), data collection process for the 
Media Content was time consuming as it involved the “copy and paste” of each article with their 
respective references prior to saving on the computer. The data collected were in text format 
such as articles, interviews or reports. However, all Word documents were all “Saved As” Rich 
Text Format to be compatible with Atlas.ti. While there was no capping on the numbers, 150 
documents (n=150) were analyzed.  
The second source of data was an in-depth survey of security personnel from the National 
Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC) who are familiar with the program, and Gazetted Officers 
from KPS. This became the “NCTC Sample”. This was selected through convenience sampling 
because it was a hard-to-reach group. As Maxwell (2013) suggests, “selection decisions should 
also consider the feasibility of access and researcher relationship with study participants” (p. 99). 
Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) explain that “convenience sampling involves drawing samples that 
are both easily accessible and willing to participate in a study yet may not be the most 
appropriate to answer the research questions” (p. 170). This sample was to offer primary data for 
a comparative analysis of how perceptions of NCTC and GOs vary on certain aspects of ARP 
such as the appropriateness of granting amnesty to different targeted groups of returnees, and 
determine the implementation feasibility of ARP. There was neither limitation on the size of 




Considering that the “NCTC Sample” was more conservative than the police, an NCTC 
officer whom remains anonymous to protect his job, was the RA for this group, while the 
investigator surveyed the GOs. IRB permitted the author to obtain oral/internet based consent' 
(without signature) for this group because the research was minimal risk. This strategy was also 
meant to increase their confidence in the study, so that they might more credible responses. Their 
survey was expected to last 20-30 minutes. Potential NCTC participants were contacted via 
phone by the investigator and RA. Interested participants then received emailed recruitment 
letters, the consent script and survey. For this group, a computer survey was preferred compared 
to paper survey. Participants received open-ended questionnaires. Out of the 20 questionnaires 
that were emailed to potential participants, only 4 responded. The response rate was too low to 
allow any comparative analysis.  
Quantitative Study Design:  Police Survey 
 The third data source was quantitative in nature and came from a police survey. This was 
an in-depth survey. Survey was preferred due to their low cost and ease of distribution. They are 
also reliable and generalizable (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). A matrix format closed-ended 
questionnaire with 28 fixed questions was used. As Maxfield and Babbie (2011), suggests, the 
questionnaire was “uncluttered” to avoid the false impression that it is short. While matrix 
questionnaire makes it easy for respondents to answer questions, it may also encourage 
respondents to develop a pattern of agreeing or disagreeing with all the statements without 
understanding the questions (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011, p. 266).  
Considering that “research contexts are often complex social systems with their own 
norms, expectations, interpersonal dynamics, and insider-outsider boundaries” (Teddlie & 




included KPS approval, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the City University of 
New York (CUNY) and Research Permit from National Commission for Science, Technology, 
and Innovation (NACOSTI) in Kenya. There was no difficulty in gaining entry to Kenya Police 
considering that the author is an “insider” familiar with the chain of command and 
communication structure within the police. In September 2016, the researcher emailed a data 
collection request to the Deputy Inspector General – KPS. The Principal Assistant to the D-IG 
became the gatekeeper. The D-IG granted the permission in October 2016 (appendix G). 
Upon receipt of the D-IG’s approval, the survey was conducted in two phases. The first 
phase lasted from March to May 2017. Police commanders of various jurisdictions acted as 
gatekeepers and research assistants (RAs) in administering the survey. The investigator first 
made phone calls to the potential RAs to explain the survey and make the request to administer 
the same. It was only when the commanders accepted the request, that they received an email 
with instructions together with the survey and consent forms. In some cases, they received 
printed surveys delivered by either police riders or local security courier services at the 
researcher’s cost. Some of the RAs received tokens between US $30-100 (3,000-10,000 Kenyan 
Shillings) plus cost of printing paper when needed. Questionnaires were distributed to individual 
officers within police premises except police quarters (residential areas).  
RAs were advised to obtain voluntary informed consent of all respondents (Maxfield & 
Babbie, 2001; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). The approval letter from the D-IG was attached on 
top of each questionnaire to give the respondents confidence in the study, an approach previously 
used by Lurigio & Skogan (1994) in their survey of Chicago Police Officers. The police survey 




their participation was voluntary, that they were free to withdraw their consent, and skip 
questions that they did not want to answer.  
Those surveyed during this period included a (Higher Training Course (HTC) class at 
KPC which was surveyed by a Chief Inspector. A Master in Strategic Leadership and Command 
Course No.  3/2017 assembled at Kenya Police Staff College in Nairobi was surveyed with the 
help of the Commandant of the college. Finally, the Regional Commander Nyanza assisted with 
the survey of a Staff Flag Meeting in Nyanza Region. These four were group-administered 
surveys, which resulted into a high response rate. Of course, the flipside of having Police 
Commanders administer the survey to their juniors is that respondents may feel coerced to 
participate thus less likely to answer questions honestly (Bachman & Schutt, 2011).  
In addition, Formations directly surveyed during this phase included Kenya Airport 
Police Unit (KAPU) accessed through their Commandant. Traffic Headquarters in Nairobi, 
Kenya Police Airwing, Vigilance House, and National Police Service were surveyed with the 
help of GOs in each jurisdiction. The second phase of the survey was administered during 
summer 2017 from May to September. This included a second HTC class at KPC which was 
surveyed with the help of the Director of Studies at Senior Training Wing. In Rift Valley Region, 
a Corporal working in the Operations Room was the RA. The Regional Operations Room being a 
centralized workstation, resulted in high response rate owing to the strategic inflow of GOs into 
the OPS room. Also polled during this phase was Vigilance House, NPS Headquarters, and 
Nyeri County. 
Two police constables based in Nairobi were responsible for printing, distribution and 
collection of the survey to and from all the commanders. All completed forms in the custody of 




Gigiri in Nairobi with the help of KPS riders. The OCPD Gigiri then mailed the first batch of 
survey to the researcher at John Jay using US Postal Services when he came to Texas in April 
2017. Point of disclaimer; the OCPD Gigiri is the researcher’s brother but there was no conflict 
of interest. The remaining survey was sent directly from Kenya by DHL courier services in 
September 2017. While some regions or Formations were not directly accessible due to logistics, 
officers from those regions/Formations were nonetheless surveyed in the colleges because HTC 
classes are usually diversified and representatives from regions and units (designation). 
The quantitative research question asked; what are the perceptions of Kenyan Police 
Officers regarding countering violent extremism as a counter-terrorism strategy? The dependent 
variable was police perception (what implementers think about the CVE). Independent variables 
included rank, gender, designation, education and length of service. Perception was measured as 
pessimism, optimism, risk, preparedness, and autonomy/discretion (see Lurigio & Skogan, 1994; 
Stewart & Morris, 2009). Assessing police perceptions is important because previous studies 
have shown that police have an organizational culture of resistance to change within their 
departments. Researchers argue that attitudes must first be positively changed if new 
interventions are expected to be successful and sustainable in police departments (Skogan, 2008; 
Lurigio & Skogan, 1994;). In this regard, if police as implementers do not like CVE, then it will 
not work mainly due to police culture. Individual police officers were the units of analysis for the 
survey.  
Firebaugh (“Sample Chapter for Firebaugh, G.: Seven Rules for Social Research.,” n.d.) 
has argued, “how cases are selected is more important than how many cases are selected; and 




random sampling based on designation2 (nature of deployment) resulting into two strata; General 
Duty and Formation (specialized units) commanders because the nature of deployment in Kenya 
Police falls into these two categories (Figure 3). Essentially, stratified random sampling begins 
by “distinguishing all elements in the population based on the relevant characteristic which then 
forms the sampling strata” (Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 123). The “ultimate function of 
stratification is to organize the population into homogeneous subsets (with heterogeneity 
between subsets) and to select the appropriate number of elements from each” stratum (Maxfield 
& Babbie, 2011, p. 231).  
To be eligible for inclusion in the survey, participants had to be Gazetted Officers (GOs) 
from KPS. In this study, KPS means KPS and Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) 
(formerly Criminal Investigations Department (CID)) as defined in the Force Standing Orders 
(Government of Kenya, 2001) (Figure 4). Service Standing Order (Government of Kenya, 2018) 
recently replaced FSO after the data for the dissertation was completed. Otherwise, DCI and 
ATPU are synonymous with KPS because they have traditionally been Formations under KPS 
prior to the Promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010 (“Const2010,” n.d.). KPS and 
DCI have equally continued with joint trainings at either Kenya Police College or DCI Academy 
(formerly CID Training School). In fact, the official uniform for DCI is the KPS uniform. 
Gazetted Officers included officers from the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) 
upwards to the Inspector General (Appendix C). Though not GOs in the FSO, Chief Inspectors 
attending HTC were included because HTC is a 6-month promotional course for officers that are 
due for promotion to the ASP rank. However, Administration Police Service were excluded 
because they do not conduct criminal investigation.  
                                                 
2 The Kenya Police Service is a bureaucratic organization. In broad terms, assignment in KPS falls into two broad 




The sampling frame (list of personnel) obtained from Police Headquarters in December 
2016 while the population of DCI was confirmed via a phone call to Police Headquarters 
Personnel Office. Overall, KPS had a population, N, of 1,267 GOs (540 in GD and 725 in 
Formations) (Table 2). A random stratified sample based on a 20% selection of either subset of 
the designations was conducted to give each element in the population an equal chance of being 
selected, and ensure representativeness. This resulted into a sample size, n = 273, that is (160 GD 
and 108 Formation). There were 5 missing data for designation which were coded as 99). The 
large sample size and homogeneity of this population presumably reduced sampling error 
(Bachman & Schutt, 2011).  
Table 2: Population of Gazetted Officers in Kenya Police in 2016 
 
RANK GENERAL DUTY FORMATIONS 
Assistant Inspector General 9 33 
Commissioner of Police 65 59 
Senior Superintendent of Police 299 91 
Superintendent of Police 52 42 
Assistant Superintendent of Police 115 102 
Directorate of Criminal Investigations 0 401 
TOTAL 540 727 
GRAND TOTAL 1,267 
 

















Qualitative Analysis (Content Analysis) 
This exploratory case study was about the terrorism Amnesty and Reintegration Policy in 
Kenya. Analytic approach in case study, Yin says, involves a detailed description of the case, 
and the setting of the case within contextual conditions. This being a qualitative study, data 
collection and analysis for the qualitative study occurred concurrently to avoid piling up of 
documents (Baxter & Jack, 2008). There was no fixed pre-determined theory that was tested. 
Instead, the analysis was inductive and iterative in nature to ascertain themes set by the 
researcher before analysis began. Inductive data, Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) explain, 
“Involves arguing from particular facts or data to a general theme or conclusion” (p. 251). As 
such, the author closely read and re-read each of the documents before analysis began. 
The qualitative research question asked; what does the Amnesty and Reintegration 
program in Kenya entail. The objective here was to offer a process evaluation of ARP to see if 
there is program integrity in its implementation process, and theoretical similarities with FD 
framework. Process evaluation was achieved through a content analysis of 150 online Media 
Content (newspapers and government reports), and 4 survey questionnaires completed by 
officers from NCTC and GOs from KPS. In this regard, program integrity was reported if ARP 
was implemented in accordance with the national CVE model for Kenya (NSCVE) (Table 1).  
As stated in NSCVE, the government should develop a legislative and policy framework 
covering returnees (“problem identification”), launch a national Disengagement and 
Reintegration initiative, and monitor returnees to ensure that the initiative is not penetrated by 




capacity building at the local level by partner GK agencies (“pulling levers”. There must be 
psychological support and counselling programmes put in place to support returnees and their 
families (“reintegration services”). It must also ensure that there is effective information sharing 
between government agencies about status of returnees (“communication”), and set up a training 
clearinghouse at the NCTC for security and GK agencies engaged in CT and CVE (Model 1). 
 Besides, Maxfield & Babbie (2001) asserts that in content analysis, oral or written 
communication should be coded using a conceptual framework. Due to lack of standard 
procedure for FD process that has been systematically documented in the literature or using 
empirical research, content analysis was coded using FD framework provided by Kennedy into 
five themes as follows (Kennedy, 2006, p. 156).  
 According to Kennedy, FD framework involves selection of a particular crime problem 
(“problem identification”); convening an interagency working group of law enforcement 
practitioners, who then conduct research to identify chronic offenders or groups of offenders 
(“conducting research”). Then, they frame a response to offenders and groups of offenders using 
all available tools for sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop their continued engagement in violent 
behavior. After this, you focus social services and community resources on targeted offenders 
and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts (“reintegration services”). Finally, 
implementers must directly and repeatedly communicate with the offenders so that they may 
understand why they are receiving this special attending and the consequences if their 
subsequent behavior or misbehavior (“communication”) (Kennedy, 2006, p. 156).  
Based on this background, text management software, Atlas.ti version 7 was used for the 
content analysis because it is the version installed on the computers at the CUNY Graduate 




.doc, or pdf (Friese, 2015). It also allows the coder to import surveys to analyze answers to open-
ended questions. Importantly, it allows the coder to highlight passages, naming those codes and 
then assigning them to similar concepts in the Primary Documents (PDs) after uploading 
documents in the Hermeneutic Unit (HU). In fact, coding in Atlas.ti is “the process of assigning 
categories, concepts, or ‘codes’ to segments of information that are of interest to your research 
objectives” (Friese, 2015, p. 24; Friese, n.d., p. 7)).  
There is however no "right way" to code in Atlas.ti because researchers from different 
disciplines code in their own unique ways. Thus, the author used Code-by-List to create the 
codes then applied them as appropriate to the marked segments of the PDs. In addition, PD 
Families were used to cluster PDs based on data types. This resulted into “GK-related’ and 
“Newspapers” Document Families. There were 5 codes created before the coding began, and 18 
sub codes that emerged during the coding process (Table 3). Atlas.ti and its Copy Bundle was 
saved in personal computer and backed in a USB flash drive. This was a precautionary measure 




Report created by Super - 08/19/2017 09:14:29 PM 
"HU: [C:\Users\USER\Desktop\ATLAS.TI\Dissertation Atlas.hpr7]" 
Code-Filter: All [23] 
PD-Filter: All [150] 
Quotation-Filter: All [593] 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 
CODES                   GK-RELATED      NEWSPAPERS       Totals 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
COMMUNICATION                16             118             134 
CONDUCT RESEARCH             72              64             136 
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION       55             226             281 
PULLING LEVERS               84              67             151 
REINTEGRATION                57              99             156 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 






Report created by Super - 08/19/2017 09:26:10 PM 
"HU: [C:\Users\USER\Desktop\ATLAS.TI\Dissertation Atlas.hpr7]" 
 
Code-Filter: All [23] 
PD-Filter: All [150] 
Quotation-Filter: All [593] 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 
CODES                   GK-RELATED      NEWSPAPERS       Totals 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
agency receiving returne     0               3           3 
aim of amnesty               0               4        4 
amnesty announcement         3              63       66 
cause for return             2              43       45 
challenges                  15              65       80 
communication                5              26       31 
conduct research            58              26       84 
conferences                 39              22       61 
data type collected          1               4        5 
follow-up                    0               6        6 
legal framework             21              26       47 
number of returnees          5              79       84 
opportunities                2              19       21 
problem id                  11              12       23 
pulling levers              84              57      141 
reintegration               44              68      112 
reintegration kit            0               5        5 
role of community/religi     2               9       11 
role of police               2              16       18 
specific phone numbers       0               3        3 
target areas                 7              11       18 
timing                       1              40       41 
where                        6              15       21 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Totals                     308     622      930 
 
Table 3 is a Codes Primary Document Table (CPDT) containing frequency of codes 
across documents, generated for Code Families (the five themes). Document Families, that is, 
“Newspapers” and “GK-related” documents, defined the Scope. While these statistics do not tell 
much in a qualitative study, it makes it easy to visualize how quotations for each theme are 
distributed. This tells us the significance of each theme. There were 150 PDs analyzed as shown 
by the PD-Filter. Results indicate that out of 858 quotations, 284 quotations were in the “GK-




about “Conduct Research” Code Family compared with 118 such quotations for 
“Communication” in the “Newspapers” category (Table 3). The most important theme in the 
entire data was “Problem identification” with 281 quotations assigned to it. The “Conduct 
Research” theme is the least important with 64 quotations in the “Newspaper Document Family, 
while “Problem Identification” is the most important theme in “Newspapers” with 226 
quotations assigned to it. Table 4 is a CPDT showing all the 23 codes. These are individual 
codes, not themes. Notably, there were 930 quotations (308 in the “GK-related” and 622 in 
“Newspapers”). The most important code in the “Newspapers” is “reintegration” with 68 
quotations. Overall, the most quoted code is “pulling levers” with 141 quotations while the least 
is “problem identification” with 23 quotations.  
 
 
Table 3 was then opened in Excel Spreadsheet to generate pie charts (Figures 4 and 5) showing 
the distribution of quotations per theme in “GK-related documents” and “Newspapers” 
respectively. From Figure 4, we see that “Conduct Research” theme accounts for 25% of 
quotations in the “GK-related” and 11% in the “Newspapers” while “Pulling Levers” Code 






















In addition, “Communication” with just 6% of the quotations in the “GK-related” documents is 
the least important theme in this CF. Below are the Atlas.ti results presented using the format 
previously adopted by Friese (2011) by highlighting the output results using quotation marks.  
 
Problem Identification 
Problem identification is a key component of FD framework because FD interventions 
target few chronic offenders. In FD, police know that concentrating their crime control efforts 
chronic offenders can prevent crime. As informed by criminology theories, situational crime 
prevention strategies posit that repeat offenders account for most crimes, and that crime is 
concentrated in hotspots of crime (few places or neighborhoods). Kennedy (2006) suggests that  
FD starts with the “selection of a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or 
street drug dealing”, in this case, violent extremism. This statement was coded as “problem 
identification”. To asses this theme, a Boolean operator was applied in the Query Tool to retrieve 
information combining theme by theme (code families). As Friese (2015) noted, a query is a 
search expression built from operands (codes and code families) and operators (AND, OR.) that 
define the conditions that a quotation must meet to be retrieved. The “OR” operator retrieves all 




















Therefore, a Boolean Operator queried the themes “conduct research” OR “problem 
identification”. This generated 109 quotations in “GK-related” documents and 263 quotations in 
“Newspapers”. Friese (2011) explained that the numbers behind the codes in Atlas.ti indicate the 
frequency and the linkages to other codes (p.9). The generated query outputs were then used to 
answer various questions that assessed “problem identification” as follows; 
When was the amnesty/reintegration program initiated? What is the aim of the amnesty 
and the reintegration program? These questions were coded as “timing” and “aim of amnesty” 
respectively. Findings suggest that Kenya was in a dilemma, of how to deal with the increasing 
population of returnees in the country. This was evident in P76:17 (Primary Document # 76, 
quotation # 17) which is report on Second National Workshop on Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) held in Kwale, Kenya from January 20-22, 
2015. The document states, “The state is however left in a difficult position because arresting the 
returnees may also cause uprising amongst their communities but ignoring that they are there 
remains a problem in itself”. (“Second National Workshop on Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P76:17].  
On the same vein, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) advised 
the government to grant unconditional amnesty to Kenyans who joined Al-Shabaab terror group 
and denounced VE (Republic of Kenya & UNDP Kenya, 2015, p. 23). The NCIC officer 
[Sharamo] reported  
 “we also have had calls from the coastal political and religious leaders to have an 
amnesty so that the youths stranded in Somalia and fearing to come back can return to 




Kenya News Agency,” n.d.) [P49:4]. Sharamo however clarified that ‘Only the president 
[of Kenya] can grant such an amnesty’ [P49:6].  
Is the amnesty timed? If yes, for how long is the amnesty expected to last? Was any 
formal announcement made publicly about the commencement of the Amnesty and Reintegration 
program? These questions were coded as “timing” and “amnesty announcement” respectively. 
While publicly announcing the amnesty on April 14, 2015, the Interior Cabinet Secretary, 
General (Rtd.) Nkaissery urged radicalised youth to voluntarily surrender to the National 
Government in lieu of criminal prosecution. A Geeska Africa Online article noted that   
“Kenya has offered a ten-day amnesty to youngsters who have joined Al-Shabaab. 
Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery said on Tuesday (April 14) that the 
Government called upon all individuals who went to Somalia for training and now wish 
to disassociate themselves from terrorism to report to National government offices, to the 
County Commissioners in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa. He said the Government 
would consider granting amnesty and appropriate reintegration support” (geeskadmin, 
n.d.) [P48:1]. 
Initially timed for 10 days, the amnesty was later extended by 14 days, and then 
indefinately Goldberg (2015) showed that “Kenya has extended the amnesty period it had 
granted the already radicalized Muslim youth in Somalia by 14 days after the 10-day amnesty 
period lapsed on Thursday” [P30:1], while “Coast regional coordinator Nelson Marwa [said] that 
government will continue rehabilitating the returnees indefinitely” (“Kenya extends amnesty 
period for al-Shabaab recruits,” n.d.) [P95:1].  
Did you hold any meetings to brainstorm before the program was initiated? This was 




made the announcement in the wake of the Garissa University College attack. There is however 
evidence that GK began seeking solutions to the VE menace since 2011 through its participation 
in global CVE conferences.  
In your opinion or based on your experience so far, what do you think influenced their 
return into the country? For instance, did the announcement influence their return? Was it after 
hearing the announcement or before? Why do you think they are surrendering the way they do? 
These were each coded as “cause of return”. Results indicate that majority of returnees were 
already in the country by the time amnesty was initiated, but the amnesty was also meant to 
attract militants who were still in Somalia to return and surrender. Perhaps a credible source of 
data was a study dubbed the Socio-economic and Survey of Kenya by the International 
Organization of Immigration, SUPKEM and the Ministry of Interior interviewed 185 
respondents of the returnees in Coast (“700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” n.d.) 
[P84:4]. They found that “At least 700 Kenyans have returned home from Somalia after quitting 
the al-Shabaab terror group and Islamic State” (“700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” 
n.d) [P7:1]. 
It was however impossible to establish the number that returned from Somalia before or 
after the annoncement but they were clearly in their hundreds (“1500 Kenyans Radicalized Into 
Al Shabaab Surrendered As First Batch Complete De-Radicalization-Rehabilitation Program – 
Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.; (“700 al Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” n.d.; 
Service, 2015). Speaking at the Government Training Institute in Kwale, the Permanent 
Secretary for the Ministry of Interior, Karanja Kibicho said that ‘these [returnees] are among the 
1,000 who responded to the amnesty call by the Ministry of Interior sometime back and the 




either unfulfilled financial promises or distorted Islamic teachings. As reported by Goldberg 
(2015),   
“Most of the returnees’ narratives are characterized with a promise for a good pay…The 
promises were just empty as they underwent military training and would go for months 
without any pay” [P10:3]. 
Evidence further suggests that some returnees heeded the call to return to Kenya from 
Somalia. As GK asserts, “there was a rapid mass disengagement from Al Shabaab following the 
2014 government amnesty with hundreds of Kenyans leaving the ranks of Al Shabaab to return 
to Kenya or to their civilian lives” (NCTC, 2016) [P71:20]. Notably, most of the returnees came 
from “hotspots”, areas where youths were at high risk of radicalization and recruitment including 
Coast, North Eastern and Nairobi Regions. A United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
Kenya project report stated that,  
  “The Project targets epicenter, spillover and at-risk communities where youth and 
women are at risk of both radicalization and are victims of violent extremist acts. These 
communities include: The Northern Kenya border regions (Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir); 
the Coastline border region of Kenya (Kilifi, Kwale, Tana River, Lamu, Mombasa) and 
parts of Nairobi County” (UNDP Kenya, n.d.) [P45:2]. 
Furthermore, scanty evidence indicate that reintegration is implemented within custodial 
facilities/ prisons within the “hotspots” areas. As indicated in the “National Workshop on 
Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), “part of the activities 
could also be targeted towards convicted violent extremists in prison to ensure rehabilitation and 
a good reintegration into society upon their release” [P39:12]. Likewise, from 20-22 January 




rehabilitation “could either take place directly, or first within a detention program, before the 
next stage of reintegration into society takes place” (“Second National Workshop on 
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | ICCT,” 
n.d.) [P76:14]. The Kenya - European Union Partnership project proposal budgeted at EUR 
5,000,000 for the operationalization of the NSCVE equally projected that “The Centre [NCTC] 
[will] support effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning FTFs in prisons” (“Kenya-
EU Partnership for the implementation of the Kenya CVE Strategy,” 2017; also see “opcom-
presentation-kenya-nctc_en.pdf,” n.d.) [P72:3].  
In your estimate, how many have surrendered so far since the amnesty was announced? 
Coded as “number of returnees”, it was not possible to conclude with certainty, the exact number 
of returnees that surrendered for reintegration since the government has remained conservative 
with the statistics. Reports indicated that  
“The surrender of the youths is confidential in a bid to reduce their stigmatization and 
even possible assassination” (“Amnesty Period For Radicalized Youth Extended By 14 
Days – Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.) [P30:2].  
Evidence however indicates that hundreds of returnees have surrendered for the 
reintegration process (“Kenya’s new counter-terrorism strategies paying off - Geeska Afrika 
Online,” n.d.; “85 youths heed amnesty to quit terror groups » Capital News,” 2015; “700 al 
Shabaab recruits return to Kenya - IOM,” n.d). A more credible document was a joint report by 
Kenya and UNDP which suggested that over “250 Kenyan youths have denounced Al-Shabaab 
and handed themselves to Kenyan authorities” (Republic of Kenya-UNDP Kenya, 2015, p.23). 
The low turn-out is partly attributed to fear and insecurity among returnees. A project proposal 




Violent Extremism in the Coast Region of Kenya revealed that returnees in Lamu County are 
gripped in fear, to the extent that they only managed to interview one returnee 
(“BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - 
March 2016.pdf,” n.d.). Similar sentiments were echoed by Kwale County Commissioner, Evans 
Achoki that “returnees have been skeptical about the government’s initiative, but are slowly 
coming out after they were assured of their security” (“Al Shabaab still a major security threat to 
Kenya - returnees,” n.d., p. 62) [P19:6].  
During the interview, what kind of data do you collect? Am thinking of data such as 
where they were recruited from, how they travelled, when they left and returned to the country, 
their demographic factors etc. These two questions were each coded as “data type collected”). 
Who identifies/picks returnees or groups of offenders? Which government agency receives the 
returnees? In other words, whom do they surrender to? The last three questions were coded as 
“pulling levers”. In this regard, the codes “data type collected” and “follow-up” were queried to 
determine what the vetting process entails.  
Results show that during the Conference on Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Violent 
Extremist Offenders, participants suggested that law enforcement and intelligence agents can 
“collect information from detainees without undermining the rehabilitation process” (“National 
Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.) [P44:4]. 
Furthermore, those who surrender go through a vetting process by NCTC especially Anti-
Terrorist Police Unit and National Intelligence Service, to determine their suitability for 
inclusion, ensure continuous monitoring to prevent recidivism or joining new extremist 
networks. Results show that Kenya was advised during the National Workshop on Countering 




of why people joined” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in 
Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:12]. Similarly, during the Second National Workshop on 
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya, it was 
agreed that reintegration program for Kenya should be designed as follows; 
“Identify the group and identities of the former fighters; Develop an understanding of 
their levels of engagement and responsibility when they were engaged in terrorism. 
The state will be charged with vetting them, that is, finding out the reasons why they 
joined the group and when they joined, the training they went through and why they have 
decided to leave and reform themselves” (“Second National Workshop on 
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | 
ICCT,” n.d.), [P76:18]. 
According to the Daily Nation, “the counter-terrorism centre would try to understand 
what drove the youth to their position” (“Amnesty yields 85 radicalised youths - Daily Nation,” 
n.d.), [P91:4]. Domnic Wabala, a journalist surveyed for this dissertation also asserted that 
“Once they surrender returnees are vetted to gauge the level of radicalization before they 
undergo debriefing” [P145:20].  
What aspects of the program do you consider difficult to implement? This question was 
coded as “challenge”. Do you know whether they have changed or not? How do you feel about 
the policy overall? In your observation, what are some of the key opportunities in this program?  
What are the main challenges of this program? This was also coded as “challenges”. Is there 
anything you feel should be done to improve the program? The rest of the questions here were 




 To explore the issue of challenge to the returnees, “challenges” OR “opportunities” 
codes were queried which generated 77 quotations in the “Newspapers”. Some of the key 
challenges facing the implementation of ARP were insecurity of returnees and those involved in 
the implementation, and poor coordination between security agencies and the communities 
involved. There was also evidence of skepticism in the program among both police and members 
of public. Results show that participants in the Second National CVE Workshop held in Kenya 
from May 7-9, 2014 at the UN Office observed that “They [returnees] might fear retaliation from 
Al Shabaab, but also from the community which they re-enter.” (“Second National Workshop on 
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) in Kenya | ICCT,” 
n.d.), [P39:14]. Likewise, “He [Achoki] said returnees have to be vetted and profiled and their 
details shared among the security agents so that they are not arrested or shot down by security 
officers” (“Al Shabaab still a major security threat to Kenya - returnees,” n.d.)  [P19:8]. As Kotia 
and Abdalla (2016) reported, America cautioned that 
“while the return of the radical persons presents an opportunity for Kenyan authorities to 
elicit important information as a way of designing counter-terrorism and de-radicalization 
strategies, there is also apprehension that, if proper reintegration measures are not 
adopted, the returnees might constitute a security threat… to the country (Kotia & 
Abdalla, 2016, p. 89)” [P4:2]. 
Dominic Wabala equally observed that “hundreds of youth have so far been integrated 
but the security agencies keep a tight cap on the numbers and identities because of fear of 
revenge by cells still operating in the country who might target the returnees considered traitors” 
[P145:6]. The murder of Subira Mwangole who was a reformed returnee murdered after his 




about the safety of returnees elders (“Three Nyumba Kumi officials killed by gunmen | The Star, 
Kenya,” n.d.; “Kwale in shock as three Nyumba Kumi officials killed in one night - Daily 
Nation,” n.d.; “Reformed Al Shabaab militant is shot dead :: Kenya - The Standard,” n.d.). The 
returnees were killed after they surrendered to the State in response to the amnesty. As such, 
many felt that the incidents would cause fear among other returnees to refrain from surrendering. 
Precisely, reports indicated that 
“Police in Kwale County launched manhunt operation to find killers of a reformed Al-
Shabab member. Subira Sudi Mwangole who had joined Al-Shabaab in 2008, went to 
Somalia for training before returning to Kenya in 2009. Following government amnesty 
offer, Sudi surrendered himself to the Kenya government on February 2016. Sudi gave 
insights on how Al-Shabaab operates. He was shot dead last week in Ukunda and the 
killers fled with his motorcycle” (“Police Manhunt Operation for Killers of Reformed Al-
Shabaab Launched in Kwale – Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.) [P12:2]. 
Pwani University Professors Hassan Mwakimako and Halim Shauri concluded that 
returnees don’t trust the amnesty and fear reporting to the police due to lack of “clear guidelines 
on how they would be treated” (“Kenya: County Urges Shabaab Returnees to Surrender for 
Rehabilitation - allAfrica.com,” n.d.). Similar observation was made by BRICS East Africa pilot 
program which stressed that lack of stronger involvement of the County Government and local 
communities at the heart of the deradicalization casts doubt on the sustainability of the program 
(“BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - 
March 2016.pdf,” n.d.). 
The government has nonetheless dismissed alleged involvement of security agencies in 




trying to scare young people and prevent fighters surrendering to the government” (“IRIN | How 
Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun,” n.d) [P92:4]. In this regard, 
“The CS has however cautioned police officers from mishandling those who wish to 
denounce the Al-Qaeda linked terror group. He also says that investigations were 
ongoing over alleged forceful disappearance of youths by a section of Muslim leaders 
and human rights defenders. ‘We want to get to the bottom of the allegation…the security 
organs are there to provide security to the citizens,’ he said. Already the National Police 
Service has strongly dismissed claims that police were behind forceful disappearance of 
terror suspects. Rights defenders and political leaders have made allegations of 
disappearances in Northern Kenya, the coastal region and Nairobi.” (“Government 
extends terror amnesty to youths » Capital News,” n.d.) [P54:2].  
In their conservative culture, police are equally suspicious that some of the returnees 
might be spies camouflaging as returnees in need of assistance. Indeed, recidivism and the 
challenge of how to deal with insincere participants in CVE programs are genuine concerns to 
implementers of CVE (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). One returnee alluded to IRIN News:  
‘There is nothing like amnesty. It’s a trap,” he insisted. ‘What they mean is they send 
someone to follow you, and you have days to live.’ The former fighter believes his only 
option is to go back to Somalia” (“IRIN | How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded 
gun,” n.d) [P92:5]. 
Thus, experts have cautioned that   
“all should be wary of not making the rehab and reintegration programs too attractive, 
thereby becoming an incentive on its own in joining Al Shabaab, and next returning and 




(“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | 
ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:14].  
Evidence further suggests that program significantly suffers from poor coordination 
between security agencies and the community, and lack of transparency and information largely 
due to mistrust (“BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March 2016.pdf,” n.d.) . From the time 
of its announcement, the amnesty elicited public debate. A section of the church, led by the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya Secretary General Canon Peter Karanja rejected on 
claims that ‘any blanket amnesty is ridiculous and an affirmation that the Government is 
officially abetting terrorism’ (Kibet, 2015) [P35:2]. NCIC Commissioner Morris Dzoro however 
underscored the importance of the amnesty saying that   
 “pardon was needed for reformed radicalized youth because some of them were duped 
into joining the outlawed militia group [and] needed government machinery to offer them 
income generating activities as a way of integrating them back into society” (Mwangeka, 
n.d.),  [P25:1]. 
Precisely, “The commissioner said lack of cooperation between security agencies and 
locals has however hindered efforts to enlist the Al-Shabaab returnees”, particularly in Lamu 
where “Mr Kanyiri said family members were unwilling to surrender the returnees to the relevant 
authorities” (“Al-Shabaab recruits return to Lamu - Daily Nation,” n.d.), [P22:1]. Reports 
indicate that  
“The NCTC…emphasized the challenges that exist, such as budgetary and legal 
constraints, and the lack of sectoral ownership of both state and non-state actors and the 
coordination of activities” “National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent 




examined the effectiveness of the ARP and cooperation between County and National 
Government in CVE activities in Coast.  
BRICS East Africa report further concluded that  
“a pilot amnesty program was going on in Kwale County where about 48 returnees were 
receiving livelihood support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
They added that the program was also being criticized as being haphazard, lacking 
transparency and information on the amnesty package, and not coordinating well with 
stakeholders. Thus, the program though promising was not succeeding as expected ( 
“BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project 
Proposal - March 2016.pdf,” n.d.; “BRICS East Africa - Project Proposal - March 
2016.pdf,” n.d.)  [P33:3].  
Regardless of the challenges, GK has touted the program as “successful” in consideration of the 
250 returnees that have so far surrendered (Republic of Kenya-UNDP Kenya, 2016). 
Is there a written implementation plan?  
This variable was coded as “legal framework”. To establish if there was a written plan for 
the policy, a Boolean operator queried “legal framework” OR “aim of amnesty” codes resulting 
into 51 quotations. Findings suggest that lack of a legal framework to support ARP was another 
contentious issue among the Muslim communities who are demanding for the enactment of an 
amnesty law. Some Coast politicians dismissed the amnesty as a meagre public gimmick, while 
some Sheikhs told returnees willing to surrender to instead report to them for reintegration, as 
opposed to the government (“Sheikhs tell Shabaab deserters to go to them, not govt » Capital 




“urged the government to first gazette the amnesty, saying he is skeptical about it. ‘I 
know government communication is through gazette notices,’” (“Al Shabaab still a major 
security threat to Kenya - returnees,” n.d.), [P147:1].   
IRIN News added that 
 “there’s a big problem: it’s not working as advertised. There is no law, policy” (“IRIN | 
How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun,” n.d.) [P92:3].  
Moreover, the U.S. Department of State in its Country Reports: Africa Overview for 2015 
acknowledged that  
“The [Kenyan] government also undertook some small-scale efforts to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate former al-Shabaab fighters, facilitators and sympathizers, but efforts were 
constrained by the lack of a defined strategy, clear legal framework, or supportive public 
messaging” (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Africa Overview,” n.d.) [P24:5].  
Parliament is yet to pass an amnesty law. Nevertheless, on September 2, 2016, President 
Kenyatta launched a written implementation plan for CVE - the National Strategy for Counter 
Violent Extremism (Kiraithe, n.d.; “President Kenyatta Launches Strategy on Countering Violent 
Extremism,” 2016) (“resident Kenyatta launches new strategy to fight extremism, terror – 
Presidency,” n.d.); “BRICS_Calls_for_Concepts_-__OCT2016.pdf,” n.d.),. During the launch, 
the President stated, 
“At the core of the strategy is a need to address the challenge of individuals who have 
already been radicalised and some who have gone as far as joining terrorist groups that 
will be dealt with at the local level action and the national level action. 
The objectives of the strategy include reducing support and recruitment into terrorist 




extremists among others” (P122:2; also see P73:4). 
The strategy outlines nine pillars for implementing CVE at both national and local levels.  
Central to the dissertation are pillars that address the social aspect which reflect FD. They 
include the Legal and Policy Pillar to ensure that “relevant laws and policy frameworks must 
support CVE” (NCTC, 2016) [P71:8], the Faith Based and Ideological Pillar to ‘immunise’ the 
Kenyan population to VE ideologies. There is also Psychosocial Pillar meant to offer 
psychological and mental health support for affected individuals, promote reconciliation efforts 
through dialogue with the affected individuals and communities, and help in identifying skills 
necessary for the reintegration of reformed returnees, and finally, the Security Pillar to ensure 
that radicalization is met with the full force of law. No doubt, NSCVE leaves police with 
autonomy/discretion on how to deal with returnees. These include discretion to arrest returnees 
that fail to surrender. Others are Education Pillar, Political Pillar, Training and Capacity Building 
Pillar, Arts and Culture Pillar, and Media and Online Pillar (p. 11).  
Pulling Levers 
In FD, implementers normally focus on high-risk offenders by directly engaging in 
dialogue with the participants to disrupt/deter violence, and engage in direct communication with 
potential offenders vial a two-prolonged message from security agents and the community. 
Kennedy writes, FD framework involves “pulling together an interagency enforcement group, 
typically including police, probation, parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes federal 
enforcement agencies” (Kennedy 2006, p. 156). Thus, this statement was coded as “pulling 
levers”. A Boolean operator generated 130 quotations for “Pulling levers” OR “Reintegration” 




What agencies are involved in implementation of the program? Coded as “pulling 
levers”, evidence shows that NCTC is the implementer of ARP (NCTC, 2016) [P71:12]. NCTC 
is a multi-agency involving security agencies, but collaborates with non-state agencies including 
NGOs, donors and community leaders. According to the Security Laws Amendment Act 2014, 
NCTC consists of the National Intelligence Service, Kenya Defence Forces, NPS, and such other 
agencies as may be determined by the National Security Council (Republic of Kenya, 2014) 
[P9:4]. Key donors of CVE in Kenya since 2014 include Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the UK, Australia, Canada, and the United States. As reported by the “ICCT/UNICRI 
Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and Good Practices 
Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.),  
 “The meeting addressed… how various professionals such as psychologists, social 
workers and religious scholars should be most effectively integrated into a rehabilitation 
programme, how law enforcement and intelligence agents can collect information from 
detainees without undermining the rehabilitation process, the importance of a robust 
aftercare programme, how to best involve other key stakeholders in this process, such as 
victims and former extremists” [P44:4]. 
In its Country Report on Africa, the U.S. Department of State also acknowledged that, 
“During 2015, the Kenyan government improved its engagement with civil society, 
particularly communities at risk of radicalization in the northeast of the country. It also 
increased its efforts and coordination with international partners to advance CVE efforts, 
including prevention of radicalization, counter-messaging, and the reintegration of 
foreign terrorist fighter returnees” “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Africa 




How regularly, if any, does the team hold meetings? This was coded as “conduct 
research”. It was impossible to ascertain this question from the content analysis. What is the 
advantage of pulling levers (involving all these government agencies?). This variable was coded 
as “pulling levers”. It was not clear, what advantage “pulling levers” or this multi-agency 
approach has provided. Ideally, the logic behind pulling levers is to ensure swift and certain 
punishment for offenders that go against the set rules and standards for inclusion in the program. 
Nkaissery, “asked the courts to process deal with terrorism cases ‘swiftly and firmly’ so as to 
secure the country from terror activities” (“MOMBASA: Nkaissery seeks judiciary’s help to 
fight terrorism - Daily Nation,” n.d.), [P51:4].  
Conducting Research  
In FD, Kennedy asserts, “implementers usually relying heavily on the field experience of 
front-line police offices, to identify key offenders-and frequently groups of offenders, such as 
street gangs, drug crews, and the like- and the context of their behavior” (Kennedy, 2006, p. 156-
7). The dissertation thus coded this variable as “conducting research”. In this regard, two 
questions were raised:  
What is the role, if any, of the police in the program? This was coded as “role of police”. A 
Codes Primary Documents Table was opened in Excel Spreadsheet to show the distribution of 
quotations for five codes (communication, conduct research, pulling levers, reintegration and 
problem identification) across all PDs. Thereafter, all columns with total number of quotations 




visualization. Next, a graph (Figure 8) was then generated showing the number of quotations for 
the “Conduct research” code, across various Primary Documents.  
In Figure 6, P44 (Primary Document #44)  is the Executive Summary: Conference on 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders 2011 report (“ICCT/UNICRI 
Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and Good Practices 
Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.). It had the highest number of quotations (11) 
about “conduct research” code. Upon query, the analysis generated 16 quotations about “role of 
police” in the “Newspapers” and 2 in “GK-related” documents. Evidently, NCTC is monitoring 
returnees to ensure that they are enrolled into the program. 
 
Results also show that police, Directorate of Criminal Investigations and National 
Intelligence Service officers receive and interrogate returnees as part of the vetting and data 
collection process. As reported in the “Six Shabaab returnees surrender in Mombasa | The Star, 
Kenya,” n.d.,   
“Police are holding six suspected al Shabaab returnees who surrendered following the 10-
day amnesty issued by government. The six suspects surrendered to police in Mombasa 
this week. They are being interrogated by officers from different security agencies, 




























supposed to surrender to Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa county commissioners” (“Six 
Shabaab returnees surrender in Mombasa | The Star, Kenya,” n.d.), [P150:1; also see 
P150:2].  
Coast Police boss, Mr. [Henry] Ondiek explained that the six “will be handed over to the 
anti-terrorism police officers for further interrogation” (Onsarigo & Wabala, 2015) [P32:2]. 
According to Wabala, “Police are the first to receive the returnees and play a crucial role in 
identifying, apprehending and monitoring the returnees as they go through the reintegration 
program” [P145:18]. Likewise, AllAfrica suggested that “The Lamu County administration has 
appealed on all returnees who had been recruited to join Al-Shabaab to surrender and register 
themselves at security offices… such as county commissioners' to be registered and later 
rehabilitated” (“Kenya: County Urges Shabaab Returnees to Surrender for Rehabilitation - 
allAfrica.com,” n.d.) [P148:1]. The Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) has 
however cautioned that rehabilitation strategy “should not be wholly led by security agencies” 
(“Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya,” n.d.) [P38:3].  
Elsewhere, a Boolean operator generated 102 quotations associated with “conferences” 
OR “conduct research” codes to determine if there were any deliberations among stakeholders 
prior to the launch of ARP. As evidence has shown, GK participated in high stake global CVE 
conferences before the launch of the amnesty program. Results indicate that “On 6 – 9 December 
2011…The initial event was convened by UNICRI in Lucca, Italy in May, 2011” 
(“ICCT/UNICRI Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and 
Good Practices Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.) [P44:1]. There was another CVE 
conference held “from 20-22 January 2015 in Kwale, as a follow-up meeting to the first National 




Nairobi from 7-9 May 2014” (“CTED-ICCT-1624-Workshop-Report-7-9-May-2014-Comments-
by-Participants.pdf,” n.d.; “National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent 
Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.). [P76:2].  
Kenya also participated in the February 2015 White House Summit on Countering 
Violent Extremism meeting in Washington, DC where nations were urged to “develop a 
comprehensive, multi-stakeholder action agenda against violent extremism” (“The White House 
Summit to Counter Violent Extremism Ministerial Meeting Statement,” n.d.) [P82:2]. Thereafter 
according to the U.S. Department of State, Kenya hosted the follow-up CVE meeting - “The 
Regional CVE Conference in Nairobi, Kenya on 25th- 28th June 2015 under the theme 
Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism” [P40:1]. ICCT-The Hague noted that 
participants in the conference stressed the need to set up mechanism for vetting procedure to 
distinguish between “those who committed international crimes and those who may be eligible 
for amnesty” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | 
ICCT,” n.d.) [P39:10]. To establish how Kenya defines its target area, the author queried  
"rehabilitation" | "target areas" using a Boolean Operator which found 126 quotations. 
 
Findings suggest that during the National Workshop on Countering Incitement and 
Violent Extremism in Kenya from May 7-9 at the United Nations Office in Nairobi, the 
government was advised to target various groups of youths including, 
“young people who became involved or vulnerable for recruitment because of their direct 
circumstances and economic grievances,…[those] approached by recruiters, but who did 
not yield, and those who were acting as the facilitators of extremist organizations by 
doing some tasks, or worked as recruiters, actual fighters, or those that were in leadership 




Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.), [P39:11]. 
How do you define your target area that qualifies as returnees? This was coded as 
“target area” to mean NCTC’s definition of returnees that qualify for inclusion in the program. 
Results showed that ARP targets youths that have either left the country and joined Al-Shabaab 
in Somalia and returneed to the country, or youths who have never left the country but had been 
radicalized (“President Kenyatta Launches Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” 2016). 
According to “IRIN | How Kenya’s al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun,” n.d, Interior Ministry 
spokesman Mwenda Njoka said that “those who have been directly involved in terror activities 
against Kenya, or Kenya’s interests” will be criminally prosecuted [P92:2]. With the unveiling of 
NSCVE in 2016, Kenya defined target area as returnees who have joined terrorist groups, 
whether they are within or outside the country. In details, returnees who qualify for ARP as 
outlined in the NSCVE include:  
“1. Those that are radicalised and on the brink of joining violent extremist organisations; 
2. Members of violent extremist organisations who have not committed or facilitated 
violent attacks in Kenya or abroad…. 
3. Individuals who have voluntarily left violent extremist and terrorist organisations … 
and those who have left such groups in response to an amnesty offer; 
4. Individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalising 
fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to assist de-radicalisation efforts while serving 
their sentences” (NCTC, 2016) [P71:21]. 
5. Individuals ordered by courts to participate in de-radicalisation and reintegration 




Reintegration Services  
In FD framework, Kennedy (2006) suggests that once you frame a special enforcement 
operation directed at the targeted chronic offenders or groups of offenders, you match those 
enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the moral voices of affected 
communities to those same offenders and groups (p. 157). To assess whether there is actual 
reintegration going on on the ground, including provision of counselling and psychological 
support to returnees during reintegration process, Boolean Operation queried the “Pulling Levers 
OR Reintegration” Code Families (themes) and found 130 quotations in the “GK-related” and 
151 quotes in the “Newspapers” categories. The query report was used to answer questions under 
this theme as follows. 
What is the waiting period if any, do the returnees meet before they can be placed in a 
reintegration center? This was coded as “reintegration”. Based on the analysis, it was not 
possible to ascertain if there was a waiting period that returnees must meet before being inducted 
into the program though returnees are clearly vetted first before they are admitted into the 
amnesty program. CVE experts cautioned that “When implementing de-radicalisation or 
rehabilitation programs it is crucial to understand the behaviour and attitudes of the programme’s 
subjects [because], the inmate should demonstrate a willingness and motivation to change” 
(“ICCT/UNICRI Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Executive Summary and 
Good Practices Document now available online | ICCT,” n.d.), [P44:7].  
A 2015 US Department of State country report confirms, “The government [GK] also 
undertook some small-scale efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former al-Shabaab fighters, 
facilitators and sympathizers” (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Africa Overview,” n.d.), 




Batch Complete De-Radicalization-Rehabilitation Program – Strategic Intelligence Service,” 
n.d., “Kenyan government sponsored a de-radicalization and rehabilitation program for the youth 
with the first batch of 19 unveiled by the interior Principal Secretary Karanja Kibicho” [P13:4].  
The media reported that there is “reintegration kit” offered to the returnees, what does 
the kit entail? This was coded as “reintegration kit”. Evidence suggests that returnees that have 
gone through the reintegration training are provided with the reintegration kit including tools 
necessary to enable reformed returnees to lead a productive life upon their reintegration back in 
the society. While unveiling some of the returnees that had gone through the reintegration 
program in Coast, Interior PS Karanja Kibicho on February 22 while at the Government Training 
Institute in Kwale, reported that 19 out of 48 returnees had gone through the reintegration 
training by the government.  According to the PS,  
“The 19 [reformed returnees] were then handed what was termed as a reintegration kit, 
which included motorbikes, handcarts, together with carpentry, sewing and cooking 
equipment. The PS said through a Government-private sector partnership, they had 
tailored programmes to normalise the youths. ‘The tutors studied each of them and 
looked at the depth of their minds to remove the philosophy that caused youths to 
disregard life and property,’ he added” (1,500 Kenyan youths recruited by Al Shabaab 
have surrendered. (n.d.), P1:5; also see P1:4; P93:5]. 
What are the rules for inclusion in the program? Coded as “target area”. The rules for 
inclusion and the description of “target areas” were synonymous as already detailed under the 
“conduct research” theme and was not discussed any further here.  
Once they surrender, what happens next? Coded as “reintegration”, results indicate that 




inclusion in the program. As presented in the National Workshop on the Implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), rehabilitation entails “improvement of the ‘vetting 
procedure’, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs, as well as 
provision of counselling programs” (“National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent 
Extremism in Kenya | ICCT,” n.d.) [P39:10]. 
Results further indicate that a couple of returnees were reintegrated. During reintegration 
training, returnees receives psychological support from professional counsellors. According to 
The Standard Digital of February 23, 2016 
“The PS said through a Government-private sector partnership, they had tailored 
programmes to normalise the youths. “The tutors studied each of them and looked at the 
depth of their minds to remove the philosophy that caused youths to disregard life and 
property,” he added. The PS said the State has in place a monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism to ensure the returnees do not fall back (see 1,500 Kenyan youths recruited 
by Al Shabaab have surrendered, declares State :: Kenya - The Standard. (n.d.), P93:6). 
What kind of role does the community/religious play if any, in the implementation of the 
program? Please explain. Coded as “role of community/religious leaders”, there were 16 
Quotations found for query "role of community/religious leaders" | "rehabilitation kit".  
There were indications that the government engaged with civil societies in implementing 
ARP. As shown by joint study by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), Supreme 
Council of Kenya Muslims, and Ministry of Interior about the returnees in Coast. Ideally, NCTC 
expects members of the affected communities including religious leaders to report their missing 
children whom they suspect might have joined Al-Shabaab to them, but parents are generally 




Mr Nkaissery has since asked parents and families who have missing children suspected 
to have crossed over to Somalia or are being radicalised in the country to report to the 
police to help track them down (“Amnesty yields 85 radicalised youths - Daily Nation,” 
n.d.), P91:6. 
In another Capital Blog entitled “Amnesty for youths misled to join Al Shabaab - Capital Blog,” 
n.d., it further indicated that, 
“Similarly, any parent or guardian whose child has either gone missing, suspects that the 
child has been radicalized, or suspects the child to have been killed in Somalia is also 
called upon to report the same. Failure to report will lead to presumption that they are 
aware and condone or are party to the terrorist training with attendant criminal 
consequences.” (P28:6). 
Communication  
Communication is a key aspect of FD intervention because it calls sending both hard and 
soft messages to the offenders, by the implementers. Kennedy (2006) states that FD involves 
“Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let them know that they 
are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as shootings) will get special attention, when that 
has in fact happened to particular offenders and groups, and what they can do to avoid 
enforcement action” (p.157). This statement was coded as “communication”. A Boolean 
Operator queried “communication XOR reintegration” and generated 57 quotations in the “GK-
related” documents. The XOR operator asks that "EXACTLY one of the conditions must be met 
(Friese, 2015, p. 238). In this regard, the following questions were used to explore the nature of 




What warning message, if any, do you emphasize in your communication with the 
returnees? For example, do you tell them to stop it? Do you warn them of swift and certain 
prosecution?  Results show that, Kenyan government officials have been warning returnees who 
fail to surrender that they will face the full force of law. According to “Amnesty,” (2015) “He 
[Nkaissery] warned that “those who fail to heed this call within the prescribed time frame will be 
treated as criminals and will face the full force of the law” [P48:1].  
Do you have any specific cadre of security officers that are authorized to receive 
information from returnees? Please expound. While returnees report to security agencies 
including County Commissioners, NCTC (National Intelligence Service and ATPU) for 
subsequent vetting and interrogation before they are admitted into ARP, it was not clear if there 
were specific cadre of security officers that were authorized to receive or collect their data. 
Do you communicate with the returnees through meetings or phone? Are there any 
specific phone numbers assigned to returnees to call? Do you make any direct communication 
with the returnees warning them of the consequences of breaking the reintegration rules? If 
affirmative, what is the message you send them? There were specific phone contacts that were 
provided for those willing to surrender  (“Amnesty for youths misled to join Al Shabaab - 
Capital Blog,” n.d.) with the government urging returnees   
“to report to County Commissioner Nairobi; County Commissioner Mombasa and 
County Commissioner Garissa, or ...confidentially report through the following contacts: 
– 0701632432, 0701632643, 0701632443 or infoken247@gmail.com” [P28:4]. 
According to The Star,    
“Police are holding six suspected al Shabaab returnees who surrendered following the 10-




this week. They are being interrogated by officers from different security agencies, 
including the Anti-Terror Police Unit and National Intelligence Service... the youth are 
supposed to surrender to Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa county commissioners” (“Six 
Shabaab returnees surrender in Mombasa | The Star, Kenya,” n.d.), [P150:1].  
What kind of follow-up, if any, do members of the Working Team make with the returnees 
in the program? There was no sufficient data to demonstrate the kind of follow-up made on the 
returnees, even though NCTC is charged with monitoring returnees before and after 
reintegration. It is however clear that some hundreds of returnees surrendered to NCTC, were 
interrogated before being absorbed into the program.   
Besides, the “NCTC Sample” received an in-depth survey and results were analyzed 
using Atlas.ti. This sample was meant to offer primary data for a comparative analysis of how 
perceptions of NCTC and GOs vary on certain aspects of ARP. The researcher argued that their 
perceptions influences the implementation feasibility of ARP. Due to the low response rate from 
this sample, it was not possible to offer proper comparison. There were 12 quotations for 
“challenge” OR “timing” codes. Besides, 4 quotations were generated for “number” OR “legal 
framework” to determine the number of returnees that surrendered, and whether there is a legal 
framework supporting the amnesty program.  
Results show that lack of amnesty policy law, mistrust between community and the 
security agencies, as well as insecurity of returnees as main challenges in implementation of 
ARP. P2 is an NCTC respondent and indicated that; “The amnesty was just a press statement. 
There was no evidence that the amnesty was backed by a policy framework, gazette notice or 




P3 is an NCTC respondent, and added that “Many have surrendered; the exact number is hard to 
tell because they do so in confidentiality/discretion.” [P3:6].  
P4 is a police respondent for police and indicated that “Well [the numbers are] not really 
well documented” [P4:6]. Elsewhere, there were 7 quotations found for “data type collected” OR 
“improvement”.  Asked about the kind of data they collect during the interview, an NCTC 
respondent, cited demographic factors, “including who was their contact person, times of their 
meetings and the kind of training they were trained and in which language” [P1:7]. They also 
gather information about “The time spent in Alshabaab, and the type of training they got during 
their service to Alshabaab” [P2:11]. Another NCTC respondent added, the data collected 
include, 
“who recruited them, why they decided to join the group and why they left. More so, 
their leaders, where they trained and for how long, operations involved in, strength of the 
enemy in terms of personnel and weapons.” [P3:11]  
Asked about what they feel should be done to improve the program, the emerging themes 
were trust and security of returnees. An NCTC personnel wrote, “Security agencies should first 
establish a good working rapport and build trust with Kenyans” [P1:11]. One NCTC respondent 
said, “enough financial support [and]” [P2:15], while another added “providing their security” 
[P3:17]. In contrast, a police respondent said, “couple it with aggressive law enforcement, heavy 
detection and very deterrent measures for those apprehended. This will make peaceful surrender a 
real option” [P4:13]. Besides, they generally agreed that it is important to gather information from 
the returnees. An NCTC respondent indicated, “Getting vital information about the returnees 




Another NCTC personnel added that “The program can be exploited more to gather critical 
intelligence on AS [Al Shabaab] future plans” [P3:15].  
Finally, there were 9 quotations found for “role of community/religious leaders” OR 
“role of police” to determine the role of police and community/religious leaders in the program. 
Evidently, ccommunity/religious leaders help by “Reporting missing youths suspected to have 
joined AS to security agents.” [P3:23]. As another NCTC added, “Parents/guardians volunteer 
information about their missing kin to security forces on one hand, while on the other, security 
agents have a database of facilitators/sympathizers and youths who are suspected to have joined 
the terror group” [P3:9]. 
Quantitative Analysis  
To assess perception of Kenyan Police officers regarding countering violent extremism as 
a counter-terrorism strategy, the dependent variable, police perception of CVE was measured as 
resistance, skepticism, risk assessment, and autonomy/discretion, preparedness. Independent 
variables including rank, education, gender, and, designation, length of service were coded using 
a sheet containing closed-ended questions as follows; Gender was a binary variable coded as 1 
(male), 0 (female). Education was a nominal variable coded to reflect the highest level of 
education an officer had attained as follows; 1 (secondary/high school), 2 (diploma/higher 
diploma), 3 (bachelor degree), 4 (post graduate studies). Rank was an ordinal variable coded on a 
Likert Scale from 1 to 5, with the highest digit indicating the highest rank as follows; 5 
(Assistant Inspector General), 4 (Commissioner of Police), 3 (Senior Superintendent of Police), 2 
(Superintendent of Police), and 1 (Assistant Superintendent of Police). Designation (nature of 
deployment) was a categorical variable coded as 1 (General Duty), 0 (Formations). Finally, 




from 1 (lowest) to 4 (longest) based on a Likert Scale, precisely, 1 (<10 years), 2 (10-15 years), 3 
(16-10 years) and 4 (>20 years). Thus, the dissertation tested 14 hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
Resistance 
H1: Gender and perception about proportionality of amnesty to terrorists are related. 
H2: Designation and perceptions on whether amnesty should solely be handled by NCTC are 
independent of each other. 
Skepticism 
H3: Education and optimism that amnesty is helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists 
have a significant relationship. 
H4: There is no significant Mean (μ) difference among various lengths of service for police 
officers and their optimism that amnesty can be helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists 
(μ1= μ2= μ3= μ4). 
H5: There is an independent relationship between designation and challenges facing the 
implementation of ARP. 
Discretion/Autonomy 
H6: There no statistically significant Mean difference between GD and Formation commanders 
regarding their perception of how ARP is changing their decision-making at work. 
Preparedness 
The theme preparedness was assessed using descriptive statistics only. 




H7: There is no significant relationship between designation and “infiltration” (whether police 
should worry that participants can seize this opportunity to infiltrate their ideologies into the 
program participants by strengthening their ideologies to go back to terrorism. 
H8: There is no significant relationship between rank and “radicalization” (the extent, if any, it 
concerns police officers that the amnesty can be a platform for convergence of like-minded 
suspects to further their terrorist schemes. 
H9: There is no significant relationship between “designation and “recruitment” (whether this 
soft power approach could lead to less recruitment by Al-Shabaab within Kenya).  
H10: Gender and “implementation” (aspects of the program that police officers consider difficult 
to implement) are independent of each other. 
H11: Designation and “motivation” (factors that motivate returnees to surrender to the police) 
are not related. 
H12: Gender and “motivation” (factors that motivate returnees to surrender to the police) are not 
related. 
H13: There is no statistically significant Mean difference between perceptions of GD and 
Formation commanders regarding “appropriateness” (proportionality of amnesty to terrorist 
offences considering that amnesty has been applied to illicit firearm holders).  
H14: There is no significant association between designation and “reform” (officer’s perceptions 
on whether it is possible to know if returnees have changed/reformed).  
Survey data were entered onto Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
software then analyzed using descriptive statistics, Chi-Squares, T-Tests, and ANOVA. Notably, 
confidence of 95% and alpha level of .05 were used to determine statistical significance of all the 




clearance, quantitative analysis was postponed until the investigator received the IRB approval in 
compliance with the CUNY research regulations.  
Based on descriptive statistics, majority (220 or 81%) were male compared with 51 or 
19% female officers. There were three missing data for gender variable and were coded as 99. 
GD were the majority (160 or 60%) compared with 108 or 40% from Formations. Senior 
Superintendents accounted for (36%), followed by Assistant Superintendents (34%), 
Commissioner of Police (15%) and Superintendents (13%). AIG were the fewest (2%). Out of 
271 participants, 43% were secondary/high school leavers (HS) which is sensible because the 
minimum academic qualification for enlistment in the police is HS certificate. There were 
Bachelor Degree holders (25%), Diploma/Higher Diploma (Dip) (equivalent to a two-year 
college in the US) (23%), and Post-Graduates were 9%. Majority had long service record 
spanning >  20 years (73.2%), 14.3% had served for 16-20 years, 11.4% had served for 10-15 
years while 1% had served for < a decade. Results are presented under the six themes per 
following discussion. 
Resistance 
Assessing police perceptions to determine their level of resistance to ARP was important 
because ARP deviates from the traditional hard CT operations by KPS. That presents a point of 
conflict, and police as an organization may be resistant to change to such a “soft” CVE approach. 
Two questions were used to assess resistance defined here as the extent to which officers are 
dismissive in their perceptions about ARP or not.  
What is your view of amnesty for terrorists in terms of proportionality to terrorism? This 
was coded as “proportionality” and its responses coded as 1 (lenient), 0 (not lenient).  




terrorism while 34.8% think it is “not lenient” (table not shown). As shown in Figure 7, among 
male cops, majority (174 or 64.68%) think it is lenient compared with 46 (17.1%) who think it is 
not lenient. Nearly all (48) female cops think it is not lenient compared to 1 female that think it is 
lenient. 
 
Do you think this program should be handled solely by NCTC? The question was coded 
as “implementer” it being nominal variables with responses coded as 1 (yes, because it is a 
multi-agency), 2 (yes, they are better trained and prepared to implement the program), 3 (yes, 
they are likely to be trusted by the public). The responses to this question however were 
incomplete as there was no provision for negative response. Figure 8 shows that GD and 
Formation commanders hold divergent perceptions about whether NCTC should be the sole 
implementer of the ARP. The association between “designation” and “implementer” was 
statistically significant, χ2(2, N=251) = 55.624, p < .05. Overall, Formation commanders highly 
think that NCTC should be the sole implementer of ARP because “they are better trained and 
prepared to implement the program”, while GD officers agree because “it is a multi-agency”. 
Among General Duty, 100 officers think ARP should be handled solely by NCTC because “it is 
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Lenient 1 48



















a mulit-agency” compared with 42 respondents who think so because “they are better trained and 
preapred to implement the program”.  
 
Skepticism 
Culturally, police officers are very suspicious. As such, police are more likely to be 
dismissive of initiatives that deviate from their traditional crime prevention strategies. In this 
regard, understanding the extent to which police are skeptical about various aspects of ARP is 
important because the level of their skepticism influences the extent to which they will support 
CVE. Presumably, officers would mostly be skeptical (optimistic or pessimistic) about the 
benefit of ARP depending on the opportunities and challenges associated with the 
implementation of the program.  
A previous study that measured police perception in terms of skepticism was Lurigio and 
Skogan’s evaluation of Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) when Community 
Policing was introduced in the Chicago Police Department. Lurigio & Skogan (1994) measured 
police “Optimistic about CAPS-traditional”. Respondents scored these questions on a scale from 
1 (less likely) to 3 (more likely) to rate the likelihood that a variety of positive changes in 

















Figure 8: Do you think the Amnesty Program should be 
handled solely by NCTC?
Yes, they are likely to be trusted by the public
Yes, they are better trained and prepared to implement the program




They found that Sergeants and above were more optimistic than patrol officers (p<.05); 
and older Officers (age 50 and over) were more optimistic than officers in their 40s, 30s and 20s 
(p<.05) (p.327). They also measured Pessimistic about CAPS, and officers rated the likelihood 
that negative changes would occur after CAPS. Over 70% believed that community groups 
would place more unreasonable demands on police (73%) and that there would be greater citizen 
demands placed on police resources (72%) after CAPS (p. 327). In like manner, the present study 
assessed skepticism about ARP using the following questions;  
How confident are you that this program will reduce terror attacks? The question was 
coded as ordinal variable “confidence”, with responses ranging from 2 (confident) to 0 (not 
confident). Results show a fair balance between officers that felt either confident or somehow 
confident. Statistics indicate that 45% feel “confident”, 42% feel “somehow confident”, and 13% 
“not confident” that the program will reduce terror attack. In general, officers were confident that 
ARP can reduce terror attacks in the country. 
To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is helpful in disengaging or 
rehabilitating terrorists? This was coded as “optimism”, an ordinal variable with responses 
ranging from 4 (very optimistic) to 0 (not optimistic). A Chi-Square test of independence 
between “education” and “optimism” is statistically significant; χ2 (9, N=265) = 105.959, p < 
.001. Though strong, the relationship was negative.  
In other words, the higher the level of education of an officer, the less likely an officer 
will be “optimistic” that the program is helpful in disengating or rehabilitating terrorists. 
Furthermore, a One-Way ANOVA tested the hypothesis that there is no mean difference in 
“optimism” (police perception on whether the amnesty is helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating 




Table 5: One Way ANOVA showing Optimism by Length of Service 
Descriptives 
To what extent are you optimistic amnesty is helpful in  
disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists? 
Length of Service N Mean Std. Deviation 
<10 years 3 2.3333 1.15 
10-15 years 31 2.5806 .62 
16-20 years 38 1.8947 .72 
>20 years 194 1.6495 .68 
Total 266 1.8008 .748 
 
 
Results (Table 5) show that for officers that have served for “10-15 years”, M=2.58, 
SD=.62. For officers that have served for “21 years and above”, M=1.65 (rounded off), SD=.68. 
ANOVA output (Table 6) shows that F (3, 262) =17.248, p=.001 which is statistically 
significant. This implies that at least one Mean is statistically significantly different from the rest. 
However, the F test is not telling us where exactly those Mean differences exist which calls for 
the interpretation of Post-Hoc (Tukey HSD) results (Table 7).  
Table 6: ANOVA 
To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is 
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating? 
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The Tukey post hoc test (Table 7) shows that there is a statistically significant difference 
in Mean length of service between the group that served for “21 years and above” and “10-15 
years” (p=.001), and between the “16-20 years” and “10-15 years” groups (p=.001). However, 
there were no statistically significant mean differences between the groups that served “21 years 
and above” and less than 10 years (p=.321). There is 95% confidence that the Mean differences 
are not due to chance. The Tukey post hoc test revealed that the officers’ optimism that ARP is 




serving longer than 10-15 years (2.58 ± .62 years, p = .001), 16-20 years (1.89 ± .73 years, p = 
.001) and >20 years (1.65 ± .68 years, p = .001) (Table 7).  
Table 7: Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is helpful in disengaging           
                                   or rehabilitating terrorists? 
Tukey HSD 
 (I)What is your length of 
service? 
(J) What is your length of 
service? 
Mean Difference (I-J) Sig.  



























To what extent are you pessimistic that the amnesty is helpful in disengaging or 
rehabilitating terrorists? Coded as “pessimistic” with responses ranging from 2 (less 
pessimistic) to 0 (not pessimistic), results show that there was a tie between officers that were 
“pessimistic” (43%) and those that were “less pessimistic” (43%) (Frequency Table not shown).  
What are the main opportunities in this program? The question was coded as 
“opportunities” which was a nominal variable measured as follows; 1 (makes surveillance of 
terrorism easy), 2 (reintegration of terrorists prevents terror), 3 (corporation with other agencies), 
4 (moral obligation of community to help reformed returnees to desist from terrorism). As shown 
in Figure 9, approximately 34% of the respondents identified “moral obligation of community to 
help reformed returnees to desist from terrorism”, followed by 25% who felt that “reintegration 
of terrorists prevents terror”. Approximately 21% of the respondents said that the program 
provides opportunity for “corporation with other agencies”, while the remaining 20% said that 





What are the key challenges in this program? Coded as “challenges”, this was a nominal 
variable with four responses as follows, 1 (insecurity of the returnees); 2 (death of reformed 
returnees causes fear and prevents other returnees from surrendering); 3 (recidivism/reoffending 
of reformed returnees who fail to reintegrate in the society); 4 (difficulty to authenticate the 
sincerity of returnees that surrender). Descriptive statistics (frequency table not shown) show that 
40% of officers said that the main challenge is “difficulty to authentic the sincerity of returnees”. 
Likewise, 32% of the respondents believe “insecurity of the returnees from other terrorists is 
high”, while 16% and 12% identified “recidivism/re-offending of reformed returnees who fail to 
reintegrate in the society”, and “death of reformed returnees causes as a cause of fear and 
prevention of other returnees from surrendering” respectively. There was a fair balance between 
GD (9) and Formations (7) that “recidivism/reoffending of reformed returnees who fail to 




























A Chi-square test of Independence examined if there is any relationship between 
designation and “challenges”. Figure 10  demonstrates that more GD officers (25%) think that 
“insecurity of returnees from other terrorists is high” compared with just 6% of Formation 
commanders that see this as the key challenge. In contrast, more Formation commanders (25%) 
believe that “difficulty to authenicate the sincerity of returnees” is the challenge in the program 
compared with 15% of GD officers that see this as the key challenge to the program.  
Is there anything you feel should be done to improve the program? This coded as 
“improvement”, a nominal variable with two responses; 1 (police should have a much direct 
involvement in the implementation); 2 (there should be a legal framework to work with). Results 
show that over half of the respondents (56%) felt that “there should be a legal framework to 
work with” while 44% of the respondents felt that “police should have a much direct 
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Samuel Walker views discretion as a central problem in the US criminal justice system 
(see Walker, 2010; Walker, 1993). Arguably, police have enormous discretion in executing their 
official duties especially in the streets. Discretion allows police to make legally acceptable 
choices like whether to arrest or not, and the type of charges to prefer on criminal suspects which 
in turn can mean selective law enforcement. Walker observed, “The problem is not discretion 
itself, but its misuse” (Walker 1993, p. 4). In other words, despite discretion being a good thing 
for police work, it can be abused if it is not controlled. 
Despite there being police regulations, Skolnick argued that police officers are usually 
under “production pressures” to achieve high clearance rates which sometimes forces them to 
report any ambiguous cases as being suspicious circumstance (Skolnick, 1966). Likewise, due to 
isolation and “occupational solidarity’, officers tend to protect themselves not only from public 
attacks but also from fellow officers. In this manner, junior police officers tend to protect their 
fellow junior officers engaged in professional misconduct to evade any reprisal from their 
seniors (Skolinick, 1994). Police officers have no flexibility because they must obey the 
commands from their seniors. Even if the supervisors are seen to be strict on enforcing the 
administrative policies, junior officers are dealing with returnees in the streets, and the 
supervisors cannot always be present to monitor activities of their juniors. It is therefore likely 
that police, either at individual or organizational level would be concerned about interventions 
that may limit their discretionary powers or autonomy. Lurigio & Skogan (1994) defined job 
autonomy as “the degree to which employees believe that their jobs afford them discretion and 
independence” (p. 321) and this dissertation, discretion and autonomy are used interchangeably. 




How do you think the program is changing things especially decision making at work? 
This question was coded as “discretion/autonomy”, and was ordinal variable. Respondents 
scored each of the three responses on discretion/autonomy on a scale of 0 (does no limit police 
discretion/autonomy) to 2 (highly limits discretion/autonomy).  
Table 8: Independent Sample T-test between discretion and designation 
Independent Samples Test 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 




How do you think 
























An Independent Sample T-Test for the association between “discretion” and 
“designation” was conducted (Table 8). In other words, is there a mean difference between 
Formation and GD commanders regarding their perception of how ARP is changing 
discretion/decision making at work? The null hypothesis assumed that there is no difference 
between the two Means, that is, (µ1= µ2). Results indicate a statistically significant difference in 
perceptions for Formation (M=.82, S. D=.71) and GD (M=1.18, S. D=.67) designations; t (262) 
=-4.213, p = <.001. Because Formation commanders have a lesser Mean (.8) compared to GD, 
they were less likely to say that the amnesty program is limiting their discretion. The results 
suggest that designation influences perception of police officers regarding how the amnesty is 
changing their decision making at. Specifically, when designation is taken into consideration, 




other than Assistant Inspector Generals, all other officers regardless of rank, believe that ARP 
“somehow limits discretion”.  
How does it change if any, the way you are seeing or would treat terror suspects? This 
question was coded as “treatment”, a nominal variable with three response outcomes namely 2 
(positively), 1 (negatively), and 0 (I don’t know). Results indicate that, most of the respondents 
(approximately 62%) said that the program has “positively” changed the way they are seeing or 
treat terror suspects while 28% said it changed them “negatively”, and 9% “don’t know” 
(Descriptive statistics output not shown).  
Overall, to what extent if any, would you say that identifying terror suspects has 
improved since the amnesty was announced? Coded as “identification”, this was an ordinal 
variable measured as follows; 3 (yes, better off) to 0 (I’m not sure). Results show 38% of officers 
said they were “not sure”, 24% said things were “about the same”, 30% said, “better off” while 
7% said “things are worse” (Descriptive statistics output not shown).”  
Preparedness 
Police in Kenya operate under unique circumstances with limited resources including 
personnel, and lack of proper training or capacity to fight crime. It is therefore important for 
policy makers and practitioners implementing ARP to understand, police perceptions about their 
state of preparedness in implementing policies within their departments. The dissertation 
measured preparedness using two questions.  
How well are you prepared to deal with them (returnees) after they surrender within your 
jurisdiction? This variable was coded as “preparedness” and it was ordinal. Participants rated 
each of the responses depicting their levels of preparedness on a 5-point Likert Scale ranging 




officers generally feel prepared. Precisely, 42.4% of respondents feel “prepared” to deal with 
returnees when they surrender within their jurisdictions, while 23.4% feel “somewhat prepared” 
and 12.4% feel “very well prepared”. 14.1% felt they were “not prepared” while 7.3% felt “less 
prepared”. Lurigio & Skogan (1994) used a similar approach in assessing CAPS capability. In 
their study of CAPS, participants scored each of these questions on a scale of 1 (very 
unqualified) to 4 (very qualified) to rate their own ability to perform CAPS-related activities. 
They found that 42% felt either qualified or very qualified to use the CAPS model to analyze 
problems (p. 328).  
Do you think more resources should be allocated to the program? This was coded as 
“resources”, a binary variable with responses coded as 1 (yes); 0 (no). Interestingly, (260 of 267 
or 97.4%) of officers agreed that more resources should be allocated to the program (Frequency 
table not shown). Lurigio & Skogan (1994) also assessed police perceptions on CAPS resources. 
Respondents scored these questions on a scale from 1 (none) to 4 (a large amount) to rate their 
opinions regarding the amount of resources that department should commit to CAPS-related 
police activities. On average, officers felt that a moderate amount of resources should be devoted 
to such activities (p. 328).  
Risk Assessment 
Understanding police perception about risk was necessitated by the fact that police work 
is dangerous/risky. As a result, police officers are constantly concerned about their security and 
that of the communities they are sworn to serve and protect. In a previous police study, Jerome 
Skolnick studied the police in Westville California by engaging in police ride alongs. He used 
participant observations of police conduct during routine performance of their duties. He found 




authority and efficiency (Skolnick, 1966). In their effort to control crime, surveillance or 
monitoring becomes a key tool. In the case of ARP, ATPU and NIS are entrusted with the 
responsibility of monitoring returnees during and after their reintegration to prevent recidivism. 
In this regard, dissertation used nine questions under this theme to assess police perceptions 
about risk associated with ARP. 
Should police worry that participants can seize this opportunity to infiltrate their 
ideologies into the program participants by strengthening their ideologies to go back to 
terrorism? This was coded as infiltration and it was ordinal with three responses ranging from 2 
(definitely) to 0 (not really).  
 
Figure 11 is a Chi-square of Independence between “designation and infiltration” (that is, 
whether police should worry that participants can seize this opportunity to infiltrate their 
ideologies into the program participants by strengthening their ideologies to go back to 
terrorism). Results show that they generally agree because 43% answered “somewhat yes”, 34% 
answered “definitely”, while 24% said “not really”. The relationship between these two 
categorical variables was statistically significant, χ2 (2, N=265)= 77.069, < .001.  
To what extent, if any, does it concern you that the amnesty can be a platform for 
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this was an ordinal variable with responses as follows ranging from 3 (very concerned) to 1 (less 
concerned). Overall, 80% of respondents were “very concerned” that this amnesty can be a 
platform for convergence of like-minded suspects to further their terror schemes, 11% were “less 
concerned” and 8% were “not concerned” (frequency table not shown). All officers, irrespective 
or rank, were “very concerned” that that the amnesty can be a platform for convergene of like-
mided suspects to further their terrorist schemes). There is a statistically significant relationship 
between “rank” and “radicalization”, χ2 (8, N=247)= 21.481, p=.006.  
“Is it likely that Kenya could face more challenges because of the burgeoning number of 
returnees in the program?” Coded as “number”, this was an ordinal variable with responses 
measured on a three-point Likert Scale ranging from 2 (likely) to 0 (unlikely). Over half 
(54.89%) of the respondents feel that Kenya could face more challenges because of the 
burgeoning number of returnees in the program compared with 31.2% who feel that is is “very 
likely” so, and 13.91% that fell it is unlikely.  
“Do you think this “soft” power approach could lead to less recruitment by al-Shabaab 
within Kenya?”. Coded as “recruitment”, this was nominal variable coded as 1 (yes); 0 (no). 
59% felt that “yes”, this soft power approach could lead to less recruitment by al Shabaab within 
Kenya compared with 41% of the respondents that feel “no”. Figure 12 is chart from Chi-Square 
test of independence between “designation” and “recruitment”. Formation commanders (25%) 
do not think that “this soft power approach could lead to less recruitment by Al-Shabaab within 





What aspects of the program do you consider difficult to implement? Coded as 
“implementation”, this was a categorical variable with three responses; (identification of genuine 
returnees), 2 (making decision about referral for reintegration), 3 (follow-up on returnees).  Per 
results, majority of officers (55%) consider “identification of genuine returnees” as difficult, 
38% of the respondents consider “follow-up on returnees” as being difficult, while 7% consider 
“making decisions about referral for reintegration” as difficult. However, the relationship 
between “gender” and “implementation” was not statistically significant; χ2 (2, N=263) = 5.242, 
p =.073.  
To what extent do you find the program helpful? The question was coded as 
“helpfulness” with a four-point ordinal scale response ranging from 3 (better off) to 0 (no, things 
are worse). Results indicate that over half (109 of 188 or 58%) of officers find the program 
“helpful”, 57 or 30% find it “very helpful”, while 22 or 12% “don’t know” (frequency table not 
shown). In brief, majority rated the program as being helpful. 
What factors do you think motivate them to surrender to the police? This was coded as 
“motivation”, and it was nominal variable with three responses; 1 (fear of arrest), 2 (confidence 
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shows that within the Formation row, E=59.3, O=28 regarding “Fear of arrest”. In addition, 
E=76, O=32 for officers who chose “Confidence in amnesty”. Similarly, among GD officers, 
E=118, O=86.7 for the “Fear of Arrest”. Likewise, O=32, E=64.2 for “Confidence in amnesty” 
category. Due to the large residuals, the differences between E and O is not due to sampling error 
hence the null hypothesis that E equals O is rejected.  
In other words, among Formation commanders, most of the officers (76 out of 108) 
believe that returnees were motivated to surrender because they had “confidence in the amnesty” 
compared with 32 of 108 among GD officers who think so. In contrast, most of the GD officers 
(118 of 146) believe they were motivated by “fear of arrest” compared with 28 of 146 Formation 
commanders who said so. Further, there was χ2(2, N=266) = 67.733, p < .05, indicating a 
statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The null hypothesis of no 
relationship is thus rejected. The relationship between “gender and “motivation” was however 
not statistically significant; Pearson Chi-Square, χ2 (2, N=268)= 5.652, p=.059.  
Table 9: Crosstab for Motivation by Designation 
 What factors do you think motivate 



















































































Do you think the amnesty is proportionate to the terrorist offences as much as amnesty 
has been applied to other crimes such as illegal firearms? This was coded as “appropriateness” 
with four possible responses measured on a four-point ordinal scale with 4 (strongly agree) being 
the highest and 1 (strongly disagree). 
An Independent Sample-Test (Table 10) compared Mean differences in perceptions about 
proportionality (“appropriateness”) of amnesty to the terrorist offences, between GD and 
Formations. This tested the null hypothesis, H0: µ1 = µ2 (the two population means are equal). 
There was a significant difference in perceptions for Formation (M=2.49, S. D=.91) and GD 
(M=1.80, S. D=.87) designations; t (262) =6.202, p = <.001. Specifically, results suggest that 
when designation is taken into consideration, perceptions of police officers regarding 
appropriateness of amnesty to terrorists differs. In other words, the Mean for Formation=2.49 ± 
.91 and is higher than the Mean for GD = 1.80 ± .87), meaning that Formation commanders were 
more likely to say that amnesty is appropriate to terrorism, compared to GD officers. We are thus 
95% confident that the mean differences are not due to standard error or chance variation. 
 Is it possible to know if they have changed? This was coded as “reform”, a binary 
variable with responses coded as 1 (yes), 0 (no). A Chi-Square test of Independence between 
“designation” and “reform” generated a Pearson Chi-Square, χ2 (1, N=263)= 147.836, p<.001, 
indicating a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. In other words, much 
fewer (6%) GD officers were likely to believe it is not possible to know if returnees have 
changed while Formation commanders were more likely (35%) believe it is not possible (graph 
not shown). In contrast, approximately 52% of GD officers believe it is possible to know if 
returnees have changed/reformed, compared with 5% of Formation commanders that think so. 




rest of the officers believe it is not possible to know if they have changed. The relationship 
between length of service and “reform” variables however was not significant, χ2 (3, N=265)= 
5.181, p=.159. 
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t-test for Eqality of Means 
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This study involved a survey. As such, the subjects were all afforded protections like 
human subjects of research within the US. This was in tandem with the CUNY Human Research 
Protection Program (HRPP) (formerly IRB) regulations. To gain entry, the author obtained three 
approvals: letter from the D-IG KPS issued in September 2016 (appendix C). The issuance of the 




police command. The IRB approval was granted in May 2017 (appendix F). Lastly, Research 
Permit from the National Commission for Science and Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) 
in Kenya was granted on December 2017 (appendix G). Notably, NACOSTI permit costs $20 
(Kshs. 2,000) for Kenyan citizens, paid through the Kenya Commercial Bank and the receipt 
attached to the application. After the approval, a police driver collected the Permit from 
NACOSTI offices in Nairobi, then a scanned copy was texted to the investigator through 
WhatsApp. 
Besides, participants in this study were briefed and debriefed by either the investigator or 
research assistants (RAs) before and after administering the survey respectively. The investigator 
briefed RAs via phone/email about protection of data and human subjects. The briefing was 
meant to assure the potential participants that their selection was based on their professionalism 
and not politics. They were also requested by RAs to sign informed consent forms at the 
beginning of the survey. However, due to the paramilitary nature of KPS, signing consent forms 
was a slippery slope, as some officers signed forms without indicating their names while others 
did not sign at all. The paradox is whether the signatures meant their willingness to participate in 
the study as was intended by the investigator, or them feeling 'encouraged' (coerced) because the 
survey was administered by their commanders. The “NCTC Sample” however was more difficult 
to access than the police and received non-signature consent forms.  
Besides, participants in the study remained anonymous. IRB raised the question as to 
whether it would be possible for local police chiefs who acted as RAs to read their officers' 
responses, and reconstruct some respondents' identities thus risking the subjects' employability. 
Arguably, the D-IG would not have approved the study if it could risk the subjects’ 




expected to 'encourage' (coerce) staff enrollment because this was not an order from above. To 
minimize this risk, questionnaires did not bear the identities of the participants. Maxfield & 
Babbie clarified that “we talk of anonymous research when the researcher cannot associate a 
given piece of information with a given person” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2001, p. 192). It thus 
became impossible for the investigator to know participants for the police survey and partly, the 
NCTC Sample because they were administered by RAs.  
For purposes of privacy, RAs ensured that printing and storage of all questionnaires took 
place within police offices. Records of participants were locked in police cabinets to minimize 
the risk of access by unauthorized persons (Bachman & Schutt, 2011). Data in custody of the 
investigator were in turn stored at the Criminal Justice PhD Students Lounge at John Jay under 
lock and key of the researcher. The data entered in the investigator’s laptop and computer were 
equally protected with passwords accessible to the investigator only (Bachman & Schutt, 2011).  
Finally, confidentiality the idea that the researcher can link information with a given 
person’s identity but not publicly (Maxfield & Babbie, 2001, p. 192). While the researcher did 
not anticipate any risks to participants, they were informed prior to their participation that there 
was a risk related to breach of confidentiality. To minimize this risk, participants were instructed 
not to write their names on the questionnaires. Completed consent forms and questionnaires were 
equally sealed in separate envelops. Likewise, all possible identifying data like date of birth or 
Force/Service Numbers that could be used to identify subjects indirectly were altered or removed 
from the sampling frame (Bachman & Schutt, 2011). Upon graduation, the data will be destroyed 
after 3 years.  
Data Quality Issues 




Unfortunately, media reports tend to be inherently subjective and inaccurate (Silke, 2001). 
Likewise, validity -  the concern as to whether the researcher is measuring what he/she says they 
are measuring was a matter of concern. Unfortunately, there is no standard for evaluating the 
validity of conclusions in a qualitative study (Bachman & Schutt, 2011).  
Table 11: Codes Co-Occurrency Table  





conduct research 0 0.23 0.25 
pulling levers 0.05 0.01 0.15 
reintegration 0.03 0.05 0.14 
“GK-related” 
Document Family  
 
conduct research 0.03 0.11 0.19 
pulling levers 0.03 0.02 0.17 
reintegration  0 0.06 0.12 
 
To ensure confirmability, the external reader Mr. Kiraithe due to his expertize on policing 
in Kenya audited the dissertation. Essentially, he checked for discrepancies and validated 
information in the literature review section. Furthermore, the study tested for co-occurrence of 
quotations and found many codes that were co-occurring. This implies that there is consistency 
in the qualitative data. In qualitative research however, these "quasi-statistics," as Howard 
Becker calls them, only tell us a little bit about the overall shape of the data which allows us to 
use statements such as “some,” “usually,” and “most” more precise (see Maxwell, 2010).  
In this regard, Table 11 shows the number of times one code is co-occurring with another 
code. For example, the “conduct research” code co-occurs with all “problem identification” 
(0.11) within the “GK related” documents. Generally, the table shows that there were some 
corroboration and consistency in the content suggesting that the data is reliable. Nevertheless, 
this is qualitative analysis based on small a convenient sample and a very subjective coding 




The police survey questionnaire had most individual items were gauged on a 3-point 
Likert Scale ranging from lowest to highest where lower values represented stronger agreement. 
While this was a deliberate strategy by the investigator to have a relatively shorter questionnaire 
considering the tight work schedules of the cops, some of the responses were not exhaustive. As 
Stewart & Morris (2009) noted in their study which suffered from a similar limitation, future 
researchers may “expand their responses to improve construct validity by using filtering 
contingency questions” (p.298).  
Another issue is researcher’s bias/reflexivity. Maxwell (2013) argued that qualitative 
research is primarily concerned with understanding how a researcher’s values and expectations 
may have influenced the conduct and conclusions of the study and avoiding the negative 
consequences of these. While the researcher is a GO in the Kenya Police, her absence from 
active duty in the last five years meant that she had no conflict of interest nor bias attitude to 
favor GD over Formations in her interpretations of the findings. Besides, Jenkins (2015) asserts 
that “qualitative methods can improve the external validity of police research findings and 
enhance the research relationships of police academics and practitioners” (p. 502). As such, the 
police survey findings are generalizable to Kenya Police (Bachman & Schutt, 2011) albeit 
cautiously considering that the study was exploratory in nature. 
Despite the flaws, triangulation involving data collection from different individuals and 
settings, using a variety of methods, as well as different research assistants substantially reduced 
systematic biases due to a specific method (Maxwell, 2013; Yin, 2013; Baxter & Jack, 2008; 
Guba, 1981). Moreover, triangulation ensures credibility and confirmability of the qualitative 





The methodological approach to this dissertation presented various limitations. To begin 
with, the bulk of the content analysis materials were newspapers, which typically are subjective. 
Besides, the author conducted content analysis without an intercoder which further rendered the 
analysis subjective. While the researcher had limited qualitative research skills on the use of 
Atlas.ti, she consulted via email, with Dr. Ervin Kosta and Dr. Valli Rajah due to their expertise 
in using Atlas.ti. Besides, time constrain was a key challenge to data collection for the police 
survey. The period coincided with the general elections in Kenya while lasted from April to 
October 2017. Consequently, recruiting cops was difficult as majority were engaged in election 
coverage. Moreover, convincing cops to participate in a study touching on government policy 
was equally slippery, more so because they were required to sign consent forms. Worse still, 
some commanders declined to participate in the study because they did not receive the survey 
through the normal chain of command. One research assistant reported that the language used in 
the questionnaire was complicated for police.  
The fact that ARP falls under the docket of ATPU also implied that most of the GOs 
were not conversant with the program. It was also a bad idea giving computer-based survey to 
police officers considering that most KPS police offices neither have computers nor internet. 
Compared with police, recruiting the “NCTC Sample” was the most difficult as shown by their 
low response rate. Having such a small convenient sample is subject to informer bias. The 
questionnaire for “NCTC Sample” was equally very long which might have discouraged some 
from participating. 
Contribution to Public Policy and Practice 
 The major point of departure of this dissertation with previous studies on CVE, is the use 




utilizing primary data on CVE from police officers are lacking. This incorporation of police 
officers in terrorism and criminal justice research is a significant contribution on terrorism 
literature which disproportionately focuses on ex-terrorists. The study thus provides a great deal 
of guidance to both practitioners and researchers interested in CVE strategies in Africa.  
Future Research 
As APA states, “a study that solves a problem, whether theoretical or practical, once and 
for all is a rare occurrence” (APA, 2011, p 83). Considering that the present study was based on 
a process evaluation, future studies may consider collaborating with NCTC in a rigorous 
outcome evaluation to measure success/effectiveness of ARP. As Butts (2011) explained, 
process evaluation helps us to determine if there is program integrity in the way a program is 
implemented according to the intended theory and model before those interventions are subjected 
to a more rigorous outcome evaluation” (p. 10). NCTC however should share such findings with 
researchers to inform public policy debate about CVE in Africa. Secondly, the NCTC Sample 
was meant to offer primary data for a comparative analysis of how perceptions of implementers 
vary on certain aspects of ARP. However, low response rate for this group hindered a 
comprehensive analysis. It is one area that future researchers may explore to establish the 











 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This chapter is a summary of key findings, policy implication, limitations and 
recommendations for future research. This was a study about terrorism Amnesty and 
Reintegration Program (ARP), a CVE strategy launched by the Government of Kenya in 2015. 
The aim of the program was to reintegrate ex-terrorists (returnees) back to the community. 
Targeted returnees included youths that had been to Somalia as members of Al Shabaab terrorist 
group and had returned to Kenya, and radicalized youths who never left the country. However, 
returnees who have perpetrated violence against Kenya were excluded. The initiative was a 
response to the increase in terrorist attacks in the country, from Al Shabaab following the 2011 
Kenyan military invasion Somalia to fight the militia.  
 The insecurity situation thrusted Kenya into a dilemma of how to deal with the over 700 
returnees that were already in the country, as well as the counter-productivity CT operations. 
Consequently, the government advised willing returnees to surrender to the national security 
agencies in Coast, North Eastern and Nairobi Regions. In exchange for their surrender, the 
youths were provided with social services and psychological counselling to aid in their 
reintegration process. ARP was a radical paradigm shift from the country’s hard military 
operations to “soft” approach to VE. The National Counter-Terrorism Centre (Kenya), a multi-
agency composed of the military, police, intelligence service, is the sole implementer of ARP. 
Together, the agency is pulling levers with international donors and members of community to 
provide returnees in the program with pro-social skills.  
ARP makes a good case study for couple of reasons. Due to the increase in radicalization 




years, the need for evidence-based research to inform government policy and practice on CVE in 
Kenya remains crucial (NCTC, 2016). Of course, there is plenty of research on CVE around the 
world but “CVE is context specific” (Farsight, 2016; Romaniuk, 2015; Holmer, 2013; Denoeux 
and Carter, 2009).  
Central to this dissertation is the relatively biased focus of terrorism research on terrorists 
compared to law enforcement, yet police play a critical role in counter-terrorism. Specifically, 
there are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of CVE measures. Basia Spalek for 
example uses the term "connectors" to describe the role of police in terrorism prevention (Spalek, 
2014). After three years since Kenya launched ARP, important gaps still exist in our 
understanding of its implementation process, and what police as implementers think about it. 
Such information is important for determining the utility of government youth intervention 
programs for terrorism and policy improvement in CVE. Arguably, success of ARP largely 
depends on police perceptions about CVE. The dissertation has partly filled these gaps by 
examining the implementation process of ARP, and perception of Kenyan Police Officers about 
CVE using primary data from police. 
In so doing, two objectives guided the study. First, a process evaluation was conducted to 
determine if there was program integrity in implementation of ARP, and its theoretical 
similarities with focused deterrence technique. Due to the sensitivity of the program, it is 
important to emphasize that the dissertation neither measured the effectiveness of the program 
nor sought any identifying information about the returnees. Instead, process evaluation 
framework was the lens used to assess the ongoing process of Kenya's move from hard to “soft” 
power approach to determine if there was program integrity on the ground. In other words, if FD 




measure up to the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) as a CVE model, 
and what barriers stand in the way of its broader acceptance by the police doing the work? 
Program implementation was the dependent variable. Process evaluation was achieved through 
content analysis of 150 documents. Due to lack of standard procedure for FD process that has 
been systematically documented in the literature, or through empirical research, content analysis 
materials were coded into five themes (problem identification, pulling levers, conducting 
research, reintegration services, and communication) based on FD framework provided by David 
Kennedy. The coding details are shown in the subsequent paragraph. 
 According to Kennedy (2006), an FD framework begins with the selection of a particular 
crime problem (“problem identification”) in this case, VE. This is followed by convening an 
interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners who conduct research to identify 
chronic offenders or groups of offenders (“conducting research”). Then, they frame a response to 
offenders and groups of offenders using all available tools for sanctions to stop their continued 
engagement in violent behavior (“pulling levers”). After this, focus social services and 
community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention 
efforts (“reintegration services”). Finally, implementers directly and repeatedly communicate 
with the offenders so that they may understand why they are receiving this special attending and 
the consequences if their subsequent behavior or misbehavior (communication) (p. 156). 
 The second objective was to assess perceptions of senior Kenya Police Officers (Gazetted 
Officers) regarding CVE as a CT strategy. This involved an in-depth survey of a randomly 
stratified sample of 273 police officers on their perceptions about appropriateness of offering 
amnesty to terrorists. The key independent variable was designation with two strata (General 




implementers think about the CVE) was measured as pessimism, optimism, risk, preparedness, 
and autonomy/discretion. The author argued that if police officers as implementers don’t like 
CVE as shown by their perceptions about ARP, then it won’t work owing to police culture of 
resistance to change, and police discretion.   
 Based on the findings, programs adopting FD differ in their implementation processes but 
share key theoretical features with ARP especially the social aspect of FD, and the paradigm 
shift from hard to “soft” approach. Evidently, youths who surrendered were provided with 
psychological counselling as well as social services to as part of their reintegration process back 
to the society. The Anti-Terrorist Police Unit and National Intelligence Service being part of 
NCTC, play a key role in the identification, interrogation and vetting of returnees to determine 
their suitability before being referred to the program. This is a slight departure from FD where 
police normally lead in conducting research to identify chronic offenders, and warning them 
repeatedly about the consequences of their continued involvement in violence. Communication 
within ARP also appears haphazard as government officials including County Commissioners 
and Permanent Secretaries (PS) send these warnings via the media. Taken into context, this is 
expected in Kenya because NCTC reports the results of its coordinating efforts to the National 
Security Advisory Committee attended by such leaders. 
 The fact that ARP resembles FD interventions is important because FD is a promising 
strategy with evidence of success in several US jurisdictions. Such interventions significantly 
benefit from support of the US Department of Justice, example being the Strategic Alternatives 
to Community Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods. Other than drug and gun 




extremists in Kenya, is unknown. This finding is important for future outcome evaluations 
examining application of FD to CVE considering that CVE is going to stay for quite some time.  
It can be argued that CVE programs are very ambitious. Romaniuk (2015) has argued, 
CVE is a “field that has risen to prominence in a manner disproportional to its achievements”. 
ARP for instance is premised on the theory of change, the assumption that evidence-based de-
radicalization efforts that encourage collaboration/engagement between the government and the 
public can reduce or end radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups (NCTC, 
2016, p. 17). No doubt, ARP presents an opportunity for NCTC to collect relevant data from 
returnees during interrogation. Such data can help in improving de-radicalization programs in the 
country. Arguably, “we cannot reliably predict if people will re-engage in terrorism without 
knowing how or why they disengage and re-engage” (Horgan & Altier, 2012, p. 88).  
It is not obvious how many returnees returned from Somalia due to the amnesty call. 
Nonetheless, majority (at least 700) were already in the country prior to the launch. Their main 
cause of return was disillusionment after they were lured by false monetary promises by the 
militants, or distorted Salafi ideologies. Horgan & Altier (2012 observed that physical or 
psychological disengagement from terrorism can be either voluntary or involuntary, but we do 
not know how many terrorists disengage because of being apprehended, and how many volunteer 
for help. So far, about 250 returnees surrendered for the reintegration program, a move GK has 
touted as a success. This is not however unique to Kenya. Many countries with CVE programs 
including the Saudi Arabia report “success” but don’t share the details of their evaluations. That 
makes it hard for terrorism researchers to understand how governments measure their success.  
Recidivism rates and arrests would be one way of measuring the success of ARP. As 




re-engage after going through the reintegration process. Likewise, criminologists argue that 
offenders sometimes operate on a continuum where they “drift” between conventional and 
criminal behavior according to Sykes and Matza, as opposed to total desistance from criminality. 
Arguably, youths that were genuinely coerced into joining the terrorist group and willingly chose 
to disengage might benefit more from ARP unlike those that joined terrorists’ groups willingly. 
Horgan & Altier (2012) noted that “repentant and voluntary disengaged terrorist” can help 
counter VE by reducing the attraction of new terrorists (p. 84). Identification of genuine 
returnees to admit into the program however is difficult and was a major source of concern 
among police commanders as shown by the police survey findings.  
There are myriad of situational factors that are facing reintegrated returnees. To begin 
with, the reintegration program is running within counties like Kwale but prisons were equally 
recommended as possible sites for reintegration. In fact, the Kenya - European Union Partnership 
project proposal budgeted at EUR 5,000,000 for the operationalization of the NSCVE projected 
that NCTC will support effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning FTFs in prisons 
(“Kenya - European Union Partnership”, 2017). While Prisons, as Horgan et al. (2016) observed, 
afford physical separation from the violent extremist group and time for reflection necessary for 
sustaining disengagement, they can also be “schools for crime” per Cesare Lombroso where 
criminals get an opportunity to learn or toughen their criminal behavior. This calls for precaution 
from NCTC considering that most police officers viewed ARP as a risky program which can be a 
point of convergence for like-minded and insecure returnees to advance their terrorism activities.  
Put into context, reintegration is occurring within communities where drivers to 
radicalization (marginalization, poverty, youth unemployment) that first pushed youths to join 




with reintegration kit to for their survival upon reintegration, members of public are not 
necessarily prepared to embrace ex-terrorists in their backyards. A situation pits returnees into a 
disarray of fear and insecurity meaning, they are still vulnerable to Al Shabaab and Mombasa 
Republican Council rebels who are aggressively recruiting youths to join their groups. In fact, 
“reformed” militants are widely viewed as traitors by the militia and some have been murdered 
under unclear circumstances. An example being Subira Sudi Mwangole who surrendered to the 
authorities in 2016 but was soon shot dead in Ukunda by killers who fled with his motorcycle, 
presumably his reintegration kit (“Police Manhunt Operation for Killers of Reformed Al-
Shabaab Launched in Kwale – Strategic Intelligence Service,” n.d.). Left with no legitimate 
options such as securing a job, frustrated returnees might choose to re-engage in terrorism 
activities.  
In other words, like ex-offenders, reformed returnees might experience primary and 
secondary deviance due to labeling theory (Becker, 1963). This was evident with the Uganda 
Amnesty for Lord’s Resistance Army returnees who faced stigmatization upon their reintegration 
despite the initial public demand for the amnesty. Undoubtedly, Kenyan security agencies have 
played a commendable job in CT while working under unique conditions with limited resources 
necessary for monitoring returnees as a way of preventing recidivism but as has been shown like 
in other jurisdictions including the UK and America with CVE programs, such close surveillance 
of returnees has always evoked public criticism that Kenya Police are targeting/labeling Muslim 
communities as the vulnerable groups to radicalization and VE.  
Besides, there was program integrity as ARP was implemented in tandem with the 
National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE). Accordingly, GK developed the 




law, GK launched NSCVE as its implementation plan one year after granting the amnesty. 
Moreover, the NCTC as the lead implementer of CVE, is responsible for monitoring returnees to 
ensure that violent extremists do not penetrate the initiative. In so doing, NCTC is coordinating 
with various security agencies and non-state actors. During reintegration process, returnees are 
provided with psychological support and counselling programs. While NCTC shares information 
with the involved national security agencies about the status of returnees, there is poor 
coordination between NCTC and the communities involved in the program due to mistrust. The 
issue of mistrust has been discussed into detail in the subsequent paragraphs. 
CVE interventions have expanded tremendously around the world with countries like 
Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UK and Columbia taking lead in implementing similar 
disengagement programs. The emergence of CVE in Kenya however can be attributed to donors 
which have been implementing these programs through Non-Governmental Organizations. CVE 
programs including the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) launched by USAID Kenya between 
2011 and 2013 in Nairobi and Coast (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014), or Strengthening Resilience to 
Violent Extremism Horn of Africa programme project implemented in Nairobi by Royal United 
Services Institute from 2014-2017 (Zeuthen, 2015) were donor driven. ARP is however, a 
departure from the previous CVE projects because GK took the frontline to roll it out. 
It is not clear whether young democracies like Kenya are under donor pressure to 
embrace CVE policies though there is significant donor contribution to CVE. Notably, ARP 
developments have occurred in a political context wherein foreign government have been eager 
to advance CVE and the Kenyan Government has more-or-less gone along with that. The 
implication here is whether such policies will be effective and sustainable in Kenya. Importantly, 




for CVE, given the extent of donor interest (and government effort) in advancing CVE. In this 
regard, there are no doubt lessons that can and should be learned from Kenya for those 
supportive of CVE in other part of Africa and the developing world. 
The police survey findings revealed interesting findings that were mainly consistent with 
previous police perceptions studies. To begin with, the government made progress in engaging 
with civil societies including SUPKEM in implementing ARP (see “SUPKEM Countering 
Violent Extremism Workshop,” 2016). Notwithstanding, there is poor coordination between 
security agencies and the community due to mistrust which might hinder the progress of ARP. 
This observation links to Cure Violence Health Models that inherently suffer from involvement 
from faith-based community organizations and community embeddedness (Butts et al., 2015) 
due to mistrust. Since 2011, GK participated in high stake global CVE conferences that informed 
ARP during which time, trust was a major theme of discussion. Specifically, it was agreed that 
governments should place CVE under a “trusted institution”. Thus, GK must have preferred 
NCTC as the “trusted” institution to implement the program compared with police, which suffers 
from a strained relationship with minority communities that feel targeted for CT operations.  
A possible source of mistrust in ARP relates to historical practices in the country. It can 
be argued that the long history of political/ethnic intercommunal tensions in Kenya manifests in 
various ways including periodic ethnic land clashes considering that Al Shabaab is a novel 
Kenyan problem that emerged in 2011. Of course, after 9/11, Kenya took a hard-military 
approach to CT like the 2015 “Operation Sanitization of Eastleigh” that was meant to flush out 
al-Shabaab adherents and deter terrorism (“IPOA report on Usalama Watch operation in 
Eastleigh, Kenya.pdf,” n.d.) where 4,000 people were arrested and some deported or sent to 




Police crackdowns have concentrated in predominantly Muslim/Somali community 
neighborhoods like Eastleigh and refugee camps widely perceived by law enforcement as a 
hideout for illegal immigrants (IPOA, 2014) and recruitment centers for al-Shabaab members 
(UN Security Council, 2011). Clearly, CT operations will continue alongside CVE efforts 
because of the threat Al Shabaab presents to Kenya. The problem with such place-based police 
crackdowns is the public perception that police are targeting certain communities, and that 
increases the mistrust.  
Taking this further, the militia has promised to continue attacking Kenya as long as KDF 
remains in Somalia. Evidently, no East African country has faced the brutality of Al Shabaab 
outside Somalia, other than Kenya. Ironically, Uganda has contributed more troops (over 6,000) 
to AMISOM compared to Kenya (over 4,000). Clearly, the alleged retaliatory attacks of Al 
Shabaab on Kenya since 2011 after Kenya launched operation Linda Nchi in Somalia should be 
put into a historical context beyond the public discourse as to whether Kenya should withdraw 
her troops from Somalia. Traditionally, Kenya has been a home to refugees, playing a host to 
over 600, 000 refugees in Daadab and Kakuma refugee camps and it was not until recently that 
the government tightened security and attempted to close refugee camps arguing that they have 
morphed into “nursery for terrorists” (Republic of Kenya, 2013).  
Observers have argued that the ‘securitisation’ of refugee policies and repressive 
treatment of Somalis at the Kenyan refugee camps, has resulted in the increase in migration of 
Somalis from Kenya to the neighboring Uganda because Somalis are relatively better off in 
Uganda than in Kenya (Iazzolino & Hersi, n.d.). Uganda has become a safe haven for the 
increasing number of Somalis migrating from Kenya to Uganda (“A safe haven for Somalis in 




Act implemented in 2010 that gives refuges the right to identification cards. Foreign 
governments urging GK to address inequality including land issues, national identification cards, 
and marginalization to address violent extremism (European Commission, 2015; UNDP, 2016; 
“SUPKEM Countering Violent Extremism Workshop,” 2016 have echoed similar sentiments. 
Besides, mistrust must do with organizational culture of police. Obviously, ARP is a 
radical paradigm shift from the country’s heavy-handed anti-terrorism strategies to the “soft” 
power CVE approach. This approach presents a potential conflict between the paramilitary and 
closed nature of police organization and the demand of CVE interventions. Police have a culture 
of resistance to change. They also exercise enormous discretion to arrest, charge or not act when 
dealing with returnees. While police discretion is good, it can be abused. Moreover, police are 
isolated from members of public, such that they maintain an “us vs. them” mentality that 
reinforces their mistrust in the community. These are factors that are nuanced, and policy makers 
and practitioners within NCTC should not ignore otherwise CVE won’t work. As Lurigio & 
Skogan (1994) argued, initiatives in police such as community policing initiatives must be 
compatible with the existing organizational culture and climate in a department as well as the 
basic concerns and needs of police personnel (p. 329).  
Of course, GK has made deliberate efforts by adopting community policing, and most 
recently after the 2013 Westgate attack, Nyumba Kumi Initiative to enhance information sharing 
and build trust between police and public (“How ‘Nyumba kumi’ model works,” n.d.; 
“Deepening Foundations for Peacebuilding and community security,” n.d.; “Nyumba Kumi has 
little to show,” n.d.). Arguably, Nyumba Kumi might have worked in Tanzania due to Ujamaa 
(socialism) culture, but its impact in Kenya remains unclear. Culturally, police focus on fighting 




such, application of community policing or Nyumba Kumi remains a challenge in Kenya as has 
been in other countries. An example is the UK where critics of UK’s CVE strategy know as 
Prevent maintained that it to “greater mistrust of the police” (Klausen, 2009) and 
labelling/spying of Muslims as ‘suspect communities’ or susceptible to terrorist involvement 
(Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Thomas, 2010).  
Another interesting finding was the parallel distinction in perceptions between 
Formations and GD officers on appropriateness of ARP to ex-terrorisms. Unlike Formation 
commanders, GD commanders don’t think this “soft” power approach could lead to less 
recruitment by al-Shabaab within Kenya. Further, GD were more likely to report that the 
program is limiting their discretion at work compared with Formations. There was also a general 
sense of skepticism in ARP, as GD officers widely think insecurity of returnees from other 
terrorists is high, while Formation commanders widely think that it is difficult to authenticate the 
sincerity of returnees. This finding lends support to previous studies on police perceptions that 
found distinctions in police perceptions. Systsma & Piza (2017) for example found that Toronto 
Police Officers attached to the Community Oriented Policing unit were more likely to rate higher 
on perceptions of performing job duties in a procedurally just manner compared to the reactive 
unit (also see Stewart and Morris, 2009; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994).  
 A possible explanation for this distinction emanates from their roles. Ideally, GD officers 
deal with all types of criminals and may not appreciate the importance of specialized units. In 
contrast, Formations are more receptive of amnesty because from their work experience, they 
know that following the hard approach simply makes it difficult to prosecute ex-terrorists. 
Ironically, members of public don’t necessarily distinguish police along their designations. 




The fact that support for the program differs across subsets of officers (GD and 
Formations) speaks to the potential effect of the program. Considering that deployment in KPS is 
subject to transfers between Formations and GD, the way to prevent a leadership vacuum when 
an officer is transferred is to win hearts and minds of all commanders to support CVE. This calls 
for training of GOs about potential benefits of CVE and entrusting the GOs with the task to 
disseminate the information to their junior officers. As Sytsma & Piza (2017) have stressed, it is 
important for the upper management to communicate the benefits of community driven policing 
to rank-and-file police officers delivering these services. Thus, if police as implementers do not 
understand or don’t know what they are doing in CVE, then it won’t work, or it won’t work as 
fast as expected by implementers. Whereas ARP currently has the support of the government, it 
must be noted that the success of ARP/CVE largely depends on commitment of police 
commanders because they are involved in the implementation of the program. 
It should be noted that most officers perceived the program as risky, with majority 
worrying that participants can seize the opportunity to infiltrate their ideologies into the program 
participants or that Kenya is likely to face more challenges because of the burgeoning number of 
returnees into the program. Equally, there was a relative sense of resistance to the program as 
majority viewed the program as lenient on terrorists. This consensus in perceptions of GD and 
Formations about risk have a bearing on the overall success of CVE in Kenya as it reinforces 
their preference for hard CT, which in turn casts doubt on the sustainability of CVE efforts. 
 In conclusion, this study is one of the first to independently explore ARP, and perception 
of Kenyan police officers. The dissertation has demonstrated that programs adopting FD differ in 
their implementation processes but share some key theoretical features with ARP, especially the 




There is also program integrity in the manner ARP has been implemented in theory and on the 
ground. The policy implication of these findings suggests that ARP can be helpful in the 
reintegration of ex-terrorists within the Kenyan context, but there is need for a rigorous outcome 
evaluation to determine its success. The police survey has demonstrated that Formations were 
supportive of CVE than GD were. This implies that policy makers and practitioners should train 
all police commanders (GOs) about the potential benefits of CVE bearing in mind that police are 
a rigid paramilitary organization with a culture of resistance to change. Such training can change 
their perceptions about CVE, otherwise it won’t work if they don’t like CVE. Considering that 
there are a few articles on front line officials as implementers of CVE measures, this dissertation 
has contributed to CVE literature by using primary data from Kenya Police. The need for policy 
makers and practitioners to involve police commanders as part of their research remains 




























QUALITATIVE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Problem identification 
1. When was the amnesty program initiated?  
2. What is the aim of the amnesty and the rehabilitation program?  
3. Is the amnesty timed? If yes, for how long is the amnesty expected to last? 
4. Was any formal announcement made publicly about the commencement of the Amnesty 
and Reintegration program? 
5. Did you hold any meetings to brainstorm before the program was initiated? 
6. Is there a written implementation plan?  
7. In your estimate, how many have surrendered so far since the amnesty was announced?  
8. Why do you think they are surrendering the way they do?  
9. In your opinion or based on your experience so far, what do you think influenced their 
return into the country? For instance, did the announcement influence their return? Was it 
after hearing the announcement or before?  
10. Who identifies/picks returnees or groups of offenders?  
11. Which government agency receives the returnees? In other words, whom do they 
surrender to?  
12. During the interview, what kind of data do you collect?  Am thinking of data such as 
where they were recruited from, how they travelled, when they left and returned to the 
country, their demographic factors etc. 
13. What aspects of the program do you consider difficult to implement?  
14. Do you know whether they have changed or not?  
15. How do you feel about the policy overall? 
16. In your observation, what are some of the key opportunities in this program? 
17. What are the main challenges of this program?  
18. Is there anything you feel should be done to improve the program? 
 
Pulling levers 
1. What agencies are involved in implementation of the program? (Check all that apply). 
2. How regularly, if any, does the team hold meetings? 
3. What is the advantage of pulling levers (involving all these government agencies?) 
 
Conducting Research  
1. What is the role, if any, of the police in the program? 
2. How do you define your target area that qualifies as returnees? (check all that apply). 
o youths who have fled to Somalia and returned to Kenya?  
o radicalized youth who never left the country?   
o those that are radicalized and on the brink of joining violent extremist organizations. 
o members of violent extremist organizations who have not committed or facilitated 
violent attacks in Kenya? 
o individuals who have voluntarily left violent extremist and terrorist organizations 




o I know there are those that are responding to the amnesty and probably form the bulk 
of the returnees, is that true?  
o individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalizing 
fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to assist de-radicalization efforts while 
serving their sentences.  
o individuals ordered by courts to participate in de-radicalisation and reintegration 
efforts. 
 
Reintegration services  
1. What is the waiting period if any, do the returnees meet before they can be placed in a 
reintegration center?  
2. What are the rules for inclusion in the program? 
3. Once they surrender, what happens next? 
4. The media reported that there is reintegration kit offered to the returnees, what does the 
kit entail 
5. What kind of role does the community/religious play if any, in the implementation of the 
program? Please explain. 
 
Communication 
1. What warning message, if any, do you emphasize in your communication with the 
returnees? For example, do you tell them to stop it? Do you warn them of swift and 
certain prosecution? 
2. What kind of follow-up, if any, do members of the Working Team make with the 
returnees in the program? 
3. Do you communicate with the returnees through meetings or phone?  
4. Are there any specific phone numbers assigned to returnees to call? 
5. Do you have any specific cadre of security officers that are authorized to receive 
information from returnees? Please expound.  
6. Do you make any direct communication with the returnees warning them of the 




















APPENDIX B: QUANTITATIVE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Demographic factors  Discretion/ Autonomy 
1. Please state your gender (check) 
o Male   
o Female 
2. What is your highest completed level of education? 
o Secondary/High School   
o Diploma/Higher Diploma  
o Bachelor Degree  
o Post Graduate studies  
3. Please indicate your Rank  
o Senior Assistant Inspector-General  
o Assistant Inspector-General  
o Commissioner of Police  
o Senior Superintendent of Police  
o Superintendent of Police  
o Assistant Superintendent of Police  
4. Designation (chose the best that describes you). 
o General Duty  
o Formation/ Specialized Unit  
5. What is your length of service? 
o Less than 10 years 
o 10-15 years 
o 16-20 years 
o 21 years and above  
16. How do you think the Amnesty and Reintegration 
program is changing things especially decision making 
at work?  
o Highly limits police discretion/autonomy 
o Somehow limits police discretion/autonomy 
o Does not limit police discretion/autonomy 
 
17. How does it change if any, the way you are seeing or 
would treat terror suspects?  
o Positively  
o Negatively 
o I don’t know  
 
18. Overall, to what extent if any, would you say that 
identifying terror suspects has improved since the 
amnesty was announced? 
o Better off  
o About the same,  
o No, things are worse  







6. What is your view of amnesty for terrorists in terms of 
proportionality to terrorism?   
o Lenient 
o Not lenient  
 
7. Do you think this program should be handled solely 
by NCTC? 
o Yes, because it is a multi-agency 
o Yes, they are better trained and prepared to 
implement the program. 
o Yes, they are likely to be trusted by public. 
 
19. How well are you prepared to deal with them after they 
surrender within your jurisdiction?  
o Very well prepared    
o Prepared  
o Somewhat prepared  
o Not prepared  
o Less Prepared  
20. Do you think more resources should be allocated to the 
program? 
o Yes  
o No  
Skepticism 
 
Risk assessment  
 
8.  How confident are you that this program will reduce 
terror attacks? 
o Confident 
o Somehow confident  
o Not confident 
 
9. To what extent are you optimistic that the amnesty is 
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists?  
o Very optimistic 
o Optimistic 
o Less optimistic 
o Not optimistic 
 
21. Should police worry that participants can seize this 
opportunity to infiltrate their ideologies into the 
program participants by strengthening their ideologies 
to go back to terrorism? 
o Definitely 
o Somewhat Yes 
o Not Really 
22. To what extent, if any, does it concern you that the 
amnesty can be a platform for convergence of like-
minded suspects to further their terror schemes?  
o Very concerned   
o Not concerned   




10. To what extent are you pessimistic that the program is 
helpful in disengaging or rehabilitating terrorists?  
o Pessimistic 
o Less pessimistic  
o Not Pessimistic 
 
11. How do you feel about the policy overall? 
o Optimistic 
o Not optimistic 
o Less optimistic  
 
12. What are opportunities in this program? 
o Makes surveillance of terrorism easy 
o Reintegration of terrorists prevents terror 
o Corporation with other agencies  
o Moral obligation of community to help reformed 
returnees to desist from terrorism 
 
13. What are the challenges of this program?   
o Insecurity of the returnees from other terrorists is 
high 
o Death of reformed returnees causes fear and 
prevents other returnees from surrendering  
o Recidivism/reoffending of reformed returnees 
who fail to reintegrate in the society 
o Difficulty to authenticate the sincerity of 
returnees that surrender 
 
14. Is there anything you feel should be done to improve 
the program? 
o Police should have a much direct involvement in 
the implementation 
o There should be a legal framework to work with 
 
23. “Is it likely that Kenya could face [more]challenges 
because of the burgeoning number of returnees in the 
program?”  
o Very Likely  
o Likely   
o Unlikely   
24. “Do you think this “soft” power approach could lead to 




25. What aspects of the program do you consider difficult 
to implement? 
o Identification of genuine returnees 
o Making decision about referral for reintegration  
o Follow-up on returnees  
 
26. To what extent do you find the program helpful? 
o I don’t know 
o Helpful  
o Very helpful  
27. What factors do you think motivate them to surrender 
to the police? 
o Fear of arrest 
o Respect for community leaders 
o Confidence in the amnesty 
28. Do you think the amnesty is proportionate to the 
terrorist offences as much as amnesty has been applied 
to other crimes such as illegal firearms? 
o Strongly disagree 
o Disagree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 

























APPENDIX D: CONSENT FORM 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
The Graduate Center/John Jay College Criminal Justice  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
Title of Research Study: Process Evaluation of Terrorist Amnesty and Reintegration program, and 
perceptions of countering violent extremism among police officers; A case study of Kenya Police 
 
Principal Investigator: Resila Onyango-PhD Criminal Justice Student 
Faculty Advisor: Prof. Eric Piza, PhD- Assistant Professor  
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are an expert in police work or counter-
terrorism.  
Purpose:  
The purpose of this research study is not only to complete my PhD study, but to contribute to literature on 
amnesty-driven countering violent extremism (CVE) and reintegration strategy. This research thus seeks to 
explore Kenya's CVE activities, specifically the Amnesty and Reintegration (Youth Disengagement) Program. 
This is a process evaluation of the program to better understand factors that led to the creation of this 
program as well as police officer perceptions of the program. 
Procedures:   
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following: 
• Sign a consent form voluntarily. 
• Do not indicate your name in the questionnaire 
• The survey questions are straight forward and you only need to tick your preferred optional 
response. The questions are close-ended 
 
Time Commitment: 
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of <5 – 10 minutes>. 
Potential Risks or Discomforts:  
This is a low risk study. We do not anticipate any risks to you. There may be a risk related to breach of 
confidentiality, but we are asking that you do not put your name or identifying information on the survey so 
that we can minimize this risk.  Your signed consent form will not be connected to your survey responses. 
Potential Benefits:  
This study is not designed to benefit you, but will help us learn more about counter-terrorism in Kenya. 
 
Confidentiality:  
• We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected during 
this research study, and that can identify you.  
• We will protect your confidentiality by keeping the questionnaires in separate envelopes from the 
consent form to protect the identities of individual respondents.  
• Besides, you have the approval of the Deputy Inspector General of Police to participate voluntarily 
in this study.  
• Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by name. 
• The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of 
research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research 
records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information 
about you.  




• Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there 
will be no penalty to you. 
• Your participation or non-participation in this study will in no way affect your employment the 
National Police Service. 
• You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, without 
any penalty. 
• You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
 
Questions, Comments or Concerns:  
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of the following 
researcher: 
Resila Onyango, SSP on +19738836676. Resila is a Senior police officer (Senior Superintendent of Police 
(SSP) in the Kenya Police and the Principal Investigator for this study.  
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you 
would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research Compliance 
Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu. Alternately, you can write to: 
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research 
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator 
205 East 42nd Street 
New York, NY 10017 
 
 
Signature of Participant: 
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be given a copy of this 
consent form to keep.  
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Participant 
 
_________________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date  
 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
________________________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent   Date  
 
 
"If you agree to participate, please complete the attached survey and return it to Resila 
Onyango via email (ronyango@gradcenter.cuny.edu). If you would prefer, the researcher 
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